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INVOLVED APPELLATE JUDGING
SARAH M. R. CRAVENS*
I. INTRODUCTION
What happens when the parties miss the point? It is well established that
if a party has failed to address an issue, either in a lower court or in an
appellate brief, that party has waived the issue, and the court is under no
obligation to consider it.' This usual formulation of the principle focuses on
the actions and the justified expectations of the parties, rather than those of the
court. Thus it is clear that from the court's perspective, there is no obligation
to consider an issue that has not been properly raised or preserved on appeal.
It is not as clear, however, to what extent the court may choose to consider
such an issue sua sponte. Even less clear, although perhaps more interesting,
is the question of what the court should do when it notices that the parties
have failed to raise a particular argument to support an already properly raised
issue, or when the court sees an anterior issue that must logically be decided
before reaching the issues the parties have properly raised, or even when the
court sees a completely different framework in which to view the case.
That is, what happens when the parties simply miss the point? To what
extent should the court involve itself in the process by adding to or refining
the arguments the parties have made to support the issues they have raised on
appeal? Is the role of an appellate judge simply to decide between or among
the arguments set before it, implementing whatever rules of procedure apply?
Or is it to reflect on the issue the parties have brought to the court and to reach
the most correct resolution of that issue? This Article will ultimately
conclude that, above all else, these questions need to be more carefully and
openly examined by the appellate courts that deal with them. My own answer
is that judges should at least be strongly encouraged to be more "involved" in
* Associate, Arnold & Porter LLP, 2003 - ; Law Clerk for the Honorable Stephanie K.
Seymour, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 2002-2003; J.D., Washington & Lee
University School of Law, 2002; M.Phil., Cambridge University, 1999; A.B., Princeton University,
1998. The author wishes to thank Professors Brian C. Murchison, W. Bradley Wendel, and Joan M.
Shaughnessy for their guidance throughout the development of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); see also, e.g., Cubic Defense Sys.,
Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 450, 467 (1999) ("Any experienced appellate litigator knows that
issues not raised in a brief are waived.") (citing 16A Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
Juris. 3d § 3974.1 n.12 (1999)).
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the sense in which I will use that term in this Article-by using their
discretion to improve the law by implementing the most correct reasoning.
This Article concludes that judges serve in some respects as trustees or
custodians of the law, and therefore have an active role to play in directing
individual cases to the best and clearest conclusions.
One famous example of an actively involved judge is that of Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.2 In that case, when Thomas Jefferson did
not show up to argue the case, Justice Marshall took it upon himself to go
through the steps of proposing what arguments Jefferson might have made for
his side of the case:
After searching anxiously for the principles on which a contrary
opinion may be supported, none have been found which appear of
sufficient force to maintain the opposite doctrine. Such as the
imagination of the court could suggest, have been very deliberately
examined, and after allowing them all the weight which it appears
possible to give them, they do not shake the opinion which has been
formed.3
Only after he completed this exercise did Justice Marshall determine that
the Court had no jurisdiction over the case. The simpler approach would have
been to dispense with the case on the jurisdictional point without going to the
trouble of imagining an absent party's legal arguments. However, the Court
considered it a matter of sufficient importance to conduct a full exploration of
the case in order to reach the best-that is, the most correct-possible result.
This is perhaps an extreme example, but it illustrates the breadth of
possibilities for how a judge may consider a matter and how he may define his
role.
This question concerning the role of the court is somewhat distinct from
the more typical jurisprudential question of what a judge should do when
encountering an ambiguity or a gap in the law. This formulation of the
question asks not what the law is, but what the role of the judiciary is. It asks
what a judge should do (or, more particularly, what a judge may, must, or
cannot do), when personal experience, reflection, or research indicates to the
judge that there is a better argument than any of those actually presented to
the court by the parties. After all, parties may simply fail to see all of the
possible arguments relevant to the issues they have raised, or they may have
tactical or strategic reasons for arguing an issue in a particular way that omits
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Id. at 159.
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relevant legal arguments. The adversarial nature of the process is of course
intended to draw out the best arguments, but it provides no guarantee that all
pertinent arguments or theories will be presented to the court. One or more of
the omitted theories may be in some way better for the resolution of the case
than those the parties have put forward. Ultimately, this question concerns the
relative importance in our legal system of "getting it right," as opposed to just
ending a dispute between two parties, and the role the judge should play in the
process of reaching the intended goal.4
If a judge is at least permitted to consider any alternative legal theories or
reasons not presented by the parties, a question which is by no means settled,
then a further question exists regarding the lengths to which a judge may,
should, or must go in seeking the one "best" reason, for the "most correct"
result. 5 For example, is a judge limited as to the sources from which he may
bring new ideas to a case? In turn, is the judge required to involve the parties
in any arguments or modes of reasoning that go beyond those presented in the
briefs and oral arguments? 6 The answers to these questions may depend to
some extent on philosophical notions of jurisprudence, on one's concept of
the ownership of the law (whether public or private), on the value given to the
principle of precedent, and on one's method of legal reasoning. All of these
issues bear on the overall role of the judge. This Article will attempt to
4. One recent article has addressed some aspects of this question. See Adam A. Milani &
Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69
Tenn. L. Rev. 245 (2002). However, that article takes a somewhat different approach to the analysis
of the question. Milani and Smith's article begins with certain assumptions, some acknowledged,
some not. This Article will instead examine such underlying assumptions before reaching the heart
of the analysis of the question. Playing God focuses throughout on a practical solution, while this
Article first seeks answers to questions about how best to reason the way towards a practical solution.
Ultimately, I reach a different conclusion and a different practical solution. It is probably fair to say
that in many ways these two articles ultimately differ in terms of basic beliefs about the
jurisprudence and policies behind what the role of the appellate judiciary is or should be. Milani and
Smith take a certain plot of high ground in their process-dominant view, which is of course
defensible in many ways, but ultimately I conclude that a solution such as theirs is in the first place
unrealistic, due to a lack of resources necessary to achieve it, and is furthermore a bad policy in that
it permits bad lawyering to result in bad law, where that eventuality may be avoidable.
5. This Article analyzes only the question of judicial consideration of additional legal
arguments, assuming that no additional factual determinations need to be made in order to consider
those legal arguments. It assumes that any additional factual determinations would be beyond the
scope of the appellate judge's authority. Appellate courts note that even district courts act beyond
their authority in addressing facts concerning issues not raised by the parties. See, e.g., United States
v. Cofield, 272 F.3d 1303, 1307 n.4 (11 th Cir. 2001) ("The district court erred in judicially-noticing
the report, and judicially-noticing facts about an issue not raised by the parties or supported by the
evidence, and assigning weight to those facts in its credibility determinations.").
6. See, e.g., discussion, infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text, regarding the current dispute
among judges of the District of Columbia Circuit over the role of amici curiae in the context of this
question.
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determine not only what is allowed or required of judges in theory, but how
best to approach this type of situation in actual practice.
The possible approaches to this question range widely from a strict
prohibition against raising outside arguments or other considerations to an
absolute duty to find the one best theory on which to decide the case.
Between these extremes, the spectrum of possibilities includes strict
limitations, strong cautions, unfettered discretion, encouragement in limited
circumstances, and encouragement across the board. There is a similarly wide
range of possibilities in what materials and other considerations judges might
conceivably be able to draw on outside of the briefs and oral arguments.
These resources might include amici curiae, supplementary independent
experts, the judge's own past experience (as a judge, as a practicing attorney,
as an academic, or otherwise), the judge's own research, or requests for
supplemental briefing or oral argument from the parties.7
A. Ownership of the Law
In order to develop a practical approach to answering the question
presented here, it is necessary first to identify the role of the appellate judge.
In order to identify that role, however, it is necessary to start further back, by
examining the question of ownership of the law-whether, metaphorically
speaking of course, the law is the property of the public, with judges serving
as trustees of the law, or the property only of the particular parties before the
court in a specific instance, with judges constrained by the parties' control
over the issues and arguments to be considered. The answer to that question
will establish in large part the values the judge is supposed to be promoting.
This answer will also help to clarify who has control over the arguments to be
considered in a particular case. There is a tension, of course, between the
autonomy of the parties and the public interest in judicial decisions. The
background principle of standing clearly underscores the value placed on the
real interest of the parties themselves-they must have a stake in the outcome,
or they may not bring a question before the court. The discussion cannot end
with the example of standing, however, as scholars have also examined the
tension between public and private in the context of other topics, such as
settlement and vacatur by consent.8 On one side is the idea that the role of the
7. Amici present a particularly interesting question in this regard, as there seems to be an
inconsistency of opinion as to how those arguments are to be taken, regardless of whether they are
voluntary or requested by the judge.
8. See generally Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for
Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1471 (1994); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Along
similar lines, Judge Kleinfeld, of the Ninth Circuit, has expressed a strong disapproval of the practice
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court is to act as an impartial arbiter-to settle the specific disputes between
the parties before the court, answering only the questions explicitly presented,
and doing so by considering only the arguments the parties have explicitly
presented. On the other side is the idea that the role of the court is to
determine and announce what the law is, and that in a common law system,
determination of the law affects more than just the parties before a single
court in a given case. When so much value is placed on precedent, the
ramifications of decisions are too important to allow parties any kind of
absolute control over the decisionmaking process.
This debate about the ownership of the law came up in the context of a
Ninth Circuit majority's requests for supplemental briefing by both the parties
and an amicus curiae in Warren v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.9
Unfortunately, it was unclear in that case whether the dissent placed the
higher value on deference to the wishes of the parties, or on respect for the
constitutional avoidance doctrine.' 0  The issue came up somewhat less
explicitly in the context of treatment of stipulations on legal questions in
United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 1 in which the court held that there
was no impropriety in a court's refusal to accept a stipulation of the parties on
a question of law. 12
However the question of ownership of the law is resolved, it must
certainly bear on the question presented by this Article. If developing law is
to be considered the property of only the parties before the court, then judges
should take a more reserved or passive approach. If instead, judges serve as
trustees or custodians of the law, protecting a property right of the public, then
they should be under some kind of mandate to become more involved, and
of vacating judgments by consent. See, e.g., Mancinelli v. IBM Corp., 95 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir.
1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("The disposition we filed is 'not merely the property of private
litigants,' and there is a public interest in leaving it on the record because of its value 'to the legal
community as a whole."') (citations omitted).
9. 282 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
10. Id. at 1123-24 (Tallman, J., dissenting). Judge Tallman emphasized the fact that the
parties had not raised the question on which the court requested supplemental briefs and an amicus
curiae, and that "each party has advised the Court that they do not wish to [raise this question]." Id.
at 1123. He continued: "I believe it injudicious to appoint an amicus curiae to attack the
constitutionality of the parsonage income tax exclusion when no one but the other panel judges
improvidently wish to reach that issue." Id. Throughout his dissent, he continued to emphasize the
parties' failure to raise the question. Id. at 1123-24. However, intertwined with that language there
is also an argument for avoiding a constitutional issue that need not be reached. Id. In the end it is
not clear which of these arguments is dispositive.
11. 213 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2000).
12. Id. at 1167-68 (holding that non-binding nature of regulation is jurisdictional question,
which requires Court of Appeals to raise it sua sponte on appeal when parties present issue as to
compliance with regulation); see also Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942) (holding
administration of criminal law is too important to be left to stipulations of parties).
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ensure that the cases before them are decided on the best grounds, using the
best reasoning possible.
B. Definition of Terms
It will be beneficial at this stage to step back and flesh out the terms used
throughout this Article. Courts often state that an "issue" not raised below is
waived on appeal. However basic and well established the proposition may
seem, it does require some refinement.
First of all, it is clear that a party may not present an entirely new claim
that was not raised below.13  However, in Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp.,1 the Supreme Court held that once a claim is properly
presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim and is not
limited to the precise arguments made below.15 Even if a party disavows an
argument below, and does not explicitly raise it until its brief on the merits
before the appellate court, as long as the lower court has considered the
argument, as long as it is found to have been fairly embraced within the
questions presented and the argument set forth in the petition, and as long as it
is a "prior" rather than merely a "related" or "complementary" question, an
appellate court will not prevent the party from presenting the argument.
1 6
A comparison with an earlier Supreme Court case may be helpful here. In
Yee v. City of Escondido,17 the court noted the same rule-that as long as a
claim is properly before the court, a party is not limited to the arguments
made below-but found that the arguments in question were in one instance
neither raised nor addressed below, and in the other instance not fairly
included in the question on which the court had granted certiorari, so the court
would not address them.18 Even though it declined to address the arguments
in the case at hand, the Court noted the difference between what are here
referred to as "claims" and "arguments" when it pointed out that a litigant
"generally possesses the ability to frame the question... in any way he
chooses."19 The Court further noted that, as a technical matter, on occasion
the Court itself rephrases a petitioner's question or requests a petitioner to
address a point not raised in the petition.20 This Article examines the extent to
13. See, e.g., Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 1454
(IOth Cir. 1983).
14. 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
15. Id. at 378-84.
16. Id. at 379-82.
17. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
18. Id at 532-38.
19. Id. at 535.
20. Id. The Court prefaced this discussion with a point about the nature of the doctrine-that
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which the court should undertake such recasting of issues sua sponte. It
focuses not at the level of "issues" or "claims," but at the level of support for
a party's position on an issue, which might be termed "theories,"
''arguments,' ''frameworks," or "legal reasons."
A simple paradigm of the hierarchy of terms might look something like
the following: An appeal is based on "whether the lower court erred." That is
not an issue, but is broader than an issue. The issue might be styled "whether
the lower court erred by not granting a directed verdict." There is a gray area
at the next level, between issues and arguments: "whether the lower court
erred by not granting a directed verdict because stipulations were not read
into the record.,21 That might be considered either an issue or an argument.
while this is a prudential doctrine as to cases arising from the federal courts, it remains unclear
whether the rule against addressing claims not raised below is jurisdictional or prudential in cases
arising from state courts, but the Court declined to attempt to resolve that question in this case. Id at
532-33.
21. This is a gray area because courts have not been at all consistent in maintaining a clear
distinction between legal issues and legal arguments or reasons, as such. Looking back at the past
decade of Supreme Court cases demonstrates inconsistency (and perhaps a lack of awareness of, or
focus on, the issue here) in the use of these terms. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,
205 (2001) (referring to government's "arguments" for alternative "grounds," calling them
"contentions" and "arguments," but referring to parties' having "joined issue at least in part on these
points," stating that the court does not decide "questions" not raised below, then referring to these
points as "issues" outside "questions" presented) (emphasis added); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 245 n.2 (2000) (referring without definitions to party's
"theory," "claim," and "argument," then stating that "[o]nce a federal claim is properly presented, a
party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise
arguments they made below") (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992) (emphasis
added)); Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2000) (using "issues," "potential
grounds of decision," "substance of the issue," "core of [the] argument," "ground," and "arguments"
without clearly differentiating between meanings of these words); AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel.,
Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 226 n.2 (1998), reh'g denied, 524 U.S. 972 (1998) ("This issue of noncontract
evidence neither was included within the question presented for our review.., nor was raised by
respondent as an alternative ground in support of the judgment.... There was no hint of an argument
that, even if that willful breach could not form the basis for an action, other alleged intentional acts
sufficed to support the judgment below.... [W]e have no obligation to search the record for the
existence of a nonjurisdictional point not presented, and to consider a disposition (remand instead of
reversal) not suggested by either side.") (emphasis added); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166
(1997) (using word "grounds" for the proposition that party is entitled to defend judgment "on any
ground supported by the record") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519
U.S. 61, 75 n.13 (1996) (referring to "nonjurisdictional argument," but later calling it an "issue...
'fairly included' within the question presented") (emphasis added); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517
U.S. 392, 400 n.7 (1996) (declining to address "contention" (also called "argument") not explicitly
raised, and citing for support version of general rule, which states that courts "do not address
arguments that were not the basis for decision below") (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 (1996) (emphasis added)); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515
U.S. 450, 456-57 (1995) (declining to address additional argument based on a statute not raised by
party in lower court, despite being "flagged" by lower court, deeming it an issue not raised until
merits briefing at Supreme Court level) (emphasis added); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511
20041
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At the next level of particularity are the arguments to support the "because"
component of the previous statement, that is:
whether the lower court erred by not granting a directed verdict
because stipulations were not read into the record, based on the
argument that this was harmless error, based on the argument that the
stipulations were, in any event, 'deemed admitted,' or based on the
argument that failure to raise the question in the trial court constituted
a waiver.22
This Article is concerned primarily with the last two levels in this
paradigm. However, it also deals, in some instances, with "issues" to the
extent that the court may find an issue to be antecedent to, or otherwise
dispositive of the issues, claims, or questions explicitly and properly raised by
the parties. 23 The arguments on which this Article focuses also include legal
alternatives that are not based on a judge's personal, political, or religious
views or background, but that may seem, by analogy to another pre-existing
legal framework, perhaps in another type of case or another area of law, to
provide a potentially relevant approach to answering the question presented to
the judge. The question presented in this Article is whether and how a judge
should incorporate such alternative theories into the case.
C. An Apparent Answer
On a few occasions, appellate courts have made statements that might be
taken to answer the question presented here. However, in most of these cases,
the courts have supplied either no authority or weak authority to support their
U.S. 350, 360 n.5 (1994) (using interchangeably words "claim" and "argument" in declining to
address party's "alternative ground' for affirmance of suppression ruling based on Fourth
Amendment, where only Fifth Amendment argument and Section 3501 argument had been made
below) (emphasis added).
22. The examples of arguments here are drawn from the facts of United States v. Harrison, 204
F.3d 236 (D.C. Cir. 2000). (For further discussion of Harrison, see infra note 94.) In a few cases,
judges have made this distinction between issues and arguments very clear. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379-81 (1995); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 383-84 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Gallenstein v. United States, 975 F.2d 286, 290 n.4 (6th Cir.
1992). However, until all judges recognize and treat these distinctions consistently, the problems
remain.
23. Yet another gray area surrounds the question of what constitutes "raising" an issue below,
or "preserving" an issue for appeal. Some judges appear more willing than others to find that a
question or an argument was "fairly included" within the argument presented below (and therefore
appropriate for an appellate court to consider), even though not explicitly contended. See Monge v.
California, 524 U.S. 721, 741 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that issue, while not
explicitly contended, was fairly included within argument made, and thus should have been
addressed by the Court).
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statements. In several cases, the authority cited can be traced back to a 1991
Supreme Court case, Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,24 which includes a
statement that appears on the surface to answer the question.25 Ultimately,
neither Kamen nor the other cases before and after it in the line often cited can
stand up to scrutiny on this point. A close examination demonstrates not only
that the Supreme Court has not really resolved the point at issue here, but also
that the authority cited in the Court's reasoning does not provide genuine
support for the Court's conclusion.
In Kamen, the Court wrote that "[w]hen an issue or claim is properly
before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories
advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify
and apply the proper construction of governing law."26 The Court dropped a
footnote from the paragraph of the opinion in which this statement appears,
stating that judges do have discretion to ignore issues and arguments not
timely raised by the parties, but cautioned that "if a court undertakes to
sanction a litigant by deciding an effectively raised claim according to a
truncated body of law," the court should be very careful, in issuing its
opinion, not to mislead lower courts by the precedent it may establish.27
There, the Court was referring specifically to a scenario in which an
antecedent question of law may be dispositive of the question actually raised
by the parties. The quoted language from the text is, however, far from the
focus of the case. On the contrary, it is only dictum.
24. 500 U.S. 90(1991).
25. Id. at 99-100; see also supra note 21 (listing various contradictory statements bearing on
answers to this question).
26. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). This case concerned a derivative
action on behalf of shareholders in a money market fund against the investment adviser for issuing a
materially misleading proxy statement. At the district court level, the plaintiff, suing in federal court
under a federal statute, relied on federal common law for an exception to the demand requirement.
Id. at 93-94. The district court dismissed for failure to plead the exception with particularity. Id. at
94. It was not until she wrote a reply brief before the court of appeals that the plaintiff raised an
argument that state law also supported the federal common law policy, rather than the alternative
approach of the American Law Institute. Id. at 95. The court of appeals refused to consider this
argument on the grounds that it had been presented too late. Id. The Supreme Court decided that the
court of appeals had been wrong to ignore the state law consideration in such a case. Id. at 97-100.
In arguing this, the Supreme Court stated that the Court could not rely on the fact that the plaintiff
had raised it too late as support for its refusal to consider the argument. Id. at 99-100. The Court
stressed that state law was simply a factor that the Court was supposed to consider regardless of
timing and even regardless of whether the plaintiff had raised the point at all. Id. at 97-100. Thus, it
is not clear that the Court was focusing on the procedure of when a court can, may, or must consider
another argument, so much as the substance of this particular issue-i.e., that the state law was a
consideration that must of necessity come into the interpretation in which the court of appeals was
engaged.
27. Id. at 100 n.5.
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The Court did provide a citation to support its general proposition.
However, the case the Court cited, Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co.,28 does not
provide explicit support for the statement. 29 There is no legal reasoning in
Arcadia that supports the proposition for which it is cited. In Arcadia, the
Court raised an issue underlying one of those explicitly raised by the parties.30
However, the support, if any, that Arcadia provides for the broad statement in
Kamen is quite limited. First, the proposition in Kamen was apparently drawn
only from what the Arcadia Court did, not from anything it said, because the
Arcadia Court did not provide any authority for its own action. Furthermore,
the proposition that might be drawn from what the Arcadia Court did is much
narrower than the proposition for which Kamen cites it. The authority must
be limited to situations in which the lower courts have made an incorrect
assumption that is dispositive of the outcome of the issues properly raised. In
those cases, Arcadia stands for the proposition that the court may examine
that underlying assumption as an antecedent issue.31 Furthermore, while the
Arcadia Court did raise the antecedent issue of its own accord, it then sent the
case back to the lower court for incorporation of the new issue.32 Having
identified the issue that had been improperly omitted by the parties, the Court
did not take it upon itself to resolve the issue and the case as a whole. Thus,
the broad statement in Kamen, that a court is free to consider any argument
bearing on a properly raised issue, is not explicitly supported by either the
language or the action of the Arcadia Court.
The Court in Kamen made its statement only as an incidental point, rather
than as the focus of its case, and it stands on fairly shaky ground. Even
leaving aside the uncertainty of the support provided by the Arcadia
precedent, the situation in Kamen itself is not even so broad as its general
statement implies. In Kamen, the Court was considering the interpretation of
law where there is a gap to be filled. The Court held that in the particular type
of gap with which it was faced, a certain state law argument is simply one that
courts are supposed to consider as a matter of course. Thus the statement
concerning what courts are supposed to look at in deciding cases may not
have been intended as a general statement, but one applicable in those
situations in which there is one specific argument or antecedent issue that the
court is obligated to consider, regardless of whether or when the parties
themselves may have raised it. Thus it may say nothing at all authoritative
28. 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990).
29. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 99 (citing Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)).
30. Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 77-78.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 85.
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about what courts are allowed to do, or what they should do generally. The
statement in Kamen is simply broader than the situation the case really
addresses.
Two years later, the Court returned to its language from Kamen in United
States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents ofAmerica,
Inc.333 In that case, the appellate court had raised an argument of its own
accord and had ordered supplemental briefs on that omitted point.34  The
Supreme Court, in reviewing the conduct of the appellate court, stated that
"prudence" did not require the appellate court to treat the unasserted argument
as waived.35 The Court supported this assertion with a quotation of the
previously discussed language from Kamen.36  (The Court also pointed to
Arcadia, but treated the case before it differently, asking for supplemental
briefs from the parties, rather than merely raising the issue itself and then
remanding the case to the lower court.)37 Kamen and Independent Insurance
Agents are now cited on occasion for the basic proposition that as long as an
issue is properly raised, the court may consider any argument it wishes to
consider,38 despite the fact that such a broad proposition stands on somewhat
unstable ground. One might argue that the later use of Kamen has legitimized
a statement that was poorly supported and out of context when it came from
Kamen alone. However, even if it were considered well supported from the
beginning, the proposition as expressed in this line of cases still leaves unclear
the extent or scope of discretion or obligation on the part of courts, and it also
leaves very unclear the level of involvement of the parties and the power of
courts to issue their own decisions on the matters.3 9 Must the court remand
33. 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
34. Id. at 445. This argument was similar to the one raised by the Supreme Court in Arcadia:
The court of appeals raised the issue of validity of the law with which the case was concerned. Id. at
444. The court of appeals determined that the statute had been effectively repealed long before the
case arose. Id. at 444. The issue the parties had originally raised was whether the comptroller
properly relied on this statute. Id. at 443-45. Both sides presented arguments on this issue, but
neither raised the basic validity argument. Id. at 444. This could be read either as a reason to support
the issue of the propriety of reliance on the statute, or as an antecedent issue-that the fact that the
statute had been repealed disposed of the issue of proper reliance.
35. Id. at 447.
36. Id at 446 (citing Kamen, 500 U.S. at 99).
37. Compare id. at 445-48, with Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 85-86.
38. See, e.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 741 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lebron
v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1995); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 853
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161,
1167 (9th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 3 F.3d 1555, 1562 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (Silberman, J., dissenting); Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1046 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992);
Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 113 F. Supp. 2d 970, 981 (W.D. Va. 2000), rev'd on
other grounds, 18 Fed. Appx. 114 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished decision).
39. It may be helpful here to note the distinction between the Kamen and Independent
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the case, or require supplemental briefs, or may it address the matter without
the parties' involvement?
This line of cases, while it may purport to give an answer to the question
presented here, is thus not entirely satisfying. There is no apparent agreement
on a practical course of action in these situations. 4° One might anticipate
finding an answer to the question in either of two other sources: the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct ("CJC") or the individual rules of a particular court.
However, neither the CJC 41 nor the court rules42 provide any direct guidance.
Insurance Agents line of cases and the Yee and Lebron line of cases and also how they may
intertwine. The former cases focus on the discretion of the court to bring new ideas into the cases
before them. The latter cases (particularly Yee) focus on the discretion of the parties to
recharacterize the arguments they present at the appellate level. Obviously, both have implications
for the court because the latter implicates the court's ability to exclude certain material. The two
lines of cases developed independently, though Lebron eventually intertwines the two by citing both
Yee and Independent Insurance Agents for the general propositions that on the one hand, the court
cannot decline to consider a new argument for a properly raised issue, and on the other, the court, far
from being precluded from looking at new (and particularly antecedent and dispositive) arguments is
in fact encouraged to look at them independently. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 379-83. In the end, however,
even Lebron does not give a satisfactory answer to the questions presented by this Article, as the
Court fails to explain satisfactorily the extent to which the doctrine here is prudential or
jurisdictional, discretionary or obligatory, before taking a course different from those it had taken
before in similar situations. In Lebron, the Court did not request supplemental briefs on the
arguments, gave little indication of exactly what research it might have conducted on its own, and
then decided the issue at stake (whether Amtrak is a state actor) on its own, rather than remanding to
the lower court for a determination. Id. at 383-400. It remanded the case to the court of appeals only
for the further determination of whether, as a state actor, Amtrak violated the First Amendment. Id.
at 400.
40. For examples of differing views among appellate judges, see examples discussed infra Part
II.D.
41. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("CJC") advises judges to avoid the appearance of
impropriety by not allowing any personal, social, or political issues to influence their conduct or
judgment on the bench. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, § B (1990). The CJC also
advises judges not to be swayed by partisan interests or public clamor. Id, Canon 3, § B(2). The
judge is supposed to hear from everyone who has a legal interest, but not to permit or consider ex
parte communications. Id, Canon 3, § B(7). A judge also may not investigate facts independently.
Id., Canon 3, § B(7)(c), cmt. 6. The exceptions to the rules against ex parte communications include
the possibility of inviting a disinterested expert to contribute (preferably by means of an amicus brief,
and certainly the opportunity for the parties to respond), and of course, the possibility of consulting
with court personnel (such as law clerks). Id., Canon 3, Sec. B(7)(c), cmt. 4. However, judges may
not consult with other lawyers or law professors on matters pending before them. Id., Canon 3, §
B(7)(c), cmt. 1. A final general consideration is the requirement that judges resolve cases promptly
and efficiently, which would seem to counsel against too much extra research by judges into
arguments not explicitly presented by the parties. Id, Canon 3, § B(8). However, that particular
ramification is not addressed in the commentary to this section.
42. The Rules of the Supreme Court and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, as well as
individual courts' rules are similarly general in their guidance on this question. For Supreme Court
practice, Rule 14 requires that the questions (though not the specific arguments) to be considered by
the Supreme Court be contained in the petition for certiorari. SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (requiring
presentation of questions for review, "expressed concisely in relation to the circumstances of the
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Thus, there remains no explicit answer to this question,43 so this Article will
continue to seek an answer in an examination of the relevant ways in which
courts behave in practice, keeping the statement from Kamen as background.
II. PRACTICAL APPROACHES IN CURRENT CASE LAW
A survey of recent case law uncovers some aspects of what judges are in
fact doing with the cases before them, as it bears on this question. Their
approaches differ in some ways according to the level of the court,44 the
case, without unnecessary detail," noting that "statement of any question presented is deemed to
comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein," and stating that "[o]nly the questions set
out in the petition or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court"). Rule 24 requires that
the brief on the merits not raise any additional questions or change the substance of the questions
already presented, but acknowledges the freedom of the Court to "consider a plain error not among
the questions presented but evident from the record and otherwise within its jurisdiction to decide."
SUP. CT. R. 24.1(a). Rule 37 indicates that the contribution of an amicus curiae should bring to the
Court's attention "relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties." SUP. CT. R.
37.1. The general rules for appellate court practice indicate that the parties' briefs must contain their
"contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
which the [party] relies." FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A), (b). None of these rules speaks directly to the
discretion or obligation of the judges to consider arguments beyond those presented by the parties.
43. It is worth mentioning here, for the sake of exhausting all possibilities, that there is another
similar situation in which a recent Sixth Circuit case makes a broad statement as to the propriety of
sua sponte consideration of new arguments, but rests upon authority which does not in fact provide
the support asserted. In Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862, 869-70 (6th Cir. 2003), the
Sixth Circuit relied upon an argument it recognized only as a result of its independent review of the
statute at issue in the case. Id. at 869-70. The court noted that neither party had addressed the issue
on appeal or before the district court, and cited as authority for its consideration of such an issue two
prior cases. Id. The court quoted Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438
F.2d 248, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1971), as follows: "[I]f deemed necessary to reach the correct result, an
appellate court may sua sponte consider points not presented to the district court and not even raised
on appeal by either party." Baker, 349 F.3d at 870. Washington Gas Light cited as authority for this
proposition a Supreme Court case called United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 457
(1964). However, Continental Can does not actually make such a claim. The only relevant language
in the Continental Can opinion, in its entirety, is the following:
This line of commerce was not pressed upon the District Court. However, since it is
coextensive with the two industries, which were held to be lines of commerce, and since it
is composed largely, if not entirely, of the more particularized end-use lines urged in the
District Court by the Government, we see nothing to preclude us from reaching the
question of its prima facie existence at this stage of the case.
Id. at 457. Thus, the Court neither made the statement asserted by the Fourth Circuit in Washington
Gas Light, nor did it cite any authority for such a proposition.
44. This Article focuses on the appellate level, but the question it presents bears also on the role
of judges at the trial court level. At the trial court level, many of the issues to be considered and the
approaches that might be used are the same as those considered in reference to the appellate courts.
Many of the same general principles apply, as to those issues that the court should or must raise sua
sponte. Subject matter jurisdiction is one example here. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Guthrie, 233
F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting with approval that though defendant moved to dismiss on
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procedural posture, whether the case is civil or criminal, and to some extent
also according to the particular subject matter involved. After looking at
various categories of case law, this Part attempts to draw rough paradigms
from the opinions of several federal judges.
A. General Principles
Without offering a simple or uniform answer to this question, appellate
courts have articulated certain relevant background principles. There are
several matters into which courts consider themselves obligated to inquire sua
sponte. Courts must, for example, raise questions of subject matter
jurisdiction sua sponte.45 Although there is less certainty as to the level of
several theories, "[t]he district court chose one not argued by the parties: lack of a case or
controversy under Article III"). Furthermore, whatever the appellate courts do or say in the way of
raising issues independently must be seen as an indication to the lower courts that they ought to do
the same in the cases before them.
The chance for overlap in what a trial court judge might see as an "issue" rather than an
"argument" is somewhat greater than it is for the appellate judge, for whom the case has been more
narrowly tailored. Thus the question whether an issue has been raised might be treated differently at
the trial court level. A trial court judge has duties that may conflict with a perfectly passive model.
For example, the judge must ensure that the parties are being adequately represented and so may
inquire into the lawyers' theories and plans to make sure all of the relevant theories are dealt with.
See Schwarzer, infra note 54 (presenting obligation of judge to take active role in managing cases
and lawyers before him to extent of ensuring that adversarial process works); see also Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
In the broader scheme, though, is the situation in which the trial judge does not just introduce an
additional argument, but reconceptualizes, redirects, or refocuses the case before him. A prominent
example of this occurred in the agent orange litigation in the Eastern District of New York, in which
Judge Weinstein, having taken over the case during the discovery phase from Judge Pratt, informed
the lawyers of his view that causation, rather than the government contract defense, would be the
central issue in the case. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 113 (1986). As soon as he took over, Judge Weinstein, "being careful to
provide no ground for legal challenge... deftly and unmistakably turned the Agent Orange case
around, inside out, and on its head." Id. at 112. Among other things, he informed the lawyers for
both sides that, contrary to the approach of the previous five years of activity in the case, the
foremost issue was not the government contract defense, but the issue of causation. Id. at 113. Judge
Weinstein provided an entirely new framework for the cases--one which neither side had apparently
advocated.
45. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1977)
(stating that courts look into questions of jurisdiction sua sponte); United States v. Alameda Gateway
Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding question of agency's compliance with non-
binding regulation to be jurisdictional question, and citing Independent Insurance Agents and Lebron
for authority from Supreme Court encouraging courts to look into such questions sua sponte). Cases
like Alameda might fall under the jurisdictional heading, or they might fall under a separate heading
of questions of validity of law. See Warren v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 282 F.3d 1119, 1121-22
(9th Cir. 2002); U.S. Nat'l Bank of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 445-48
(1993).
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obligation, they may also raise questions regarding public policy, 46 sovereign
immunity,47 qualified immunity,48 and perhaps international conflict of laws
issues,49 as well as abstention or avoidance questions. 50  An appellate court
46. See Fomby-Denson v. Dep't of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
public policy to be an appropriate issue for courts to raise sua sponte).
[T]his case presents a threshold question not briefed by the parties whether it would be
contrary to public policy to construe a settlement agreement to bar the Army from referring
Ms. Fomby-Denson to the German authorities. Although the parties on this appeal did not
brief this issue, it is well-settled that "[e]ven if neither party's pleading or proof reveals the
contravention [of public policy], the court may ordinarily inquire into it and decide the case
on the basis of it if it finds it just to do so, subject to any relevant rules of pleading or proof
by which it is bound."
Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Intro. to ch. 8, topic t, at 5 (1981)).
47. There is some dispute as to whether sovereign immunity may be raised sua sponte, or must
be raised sua sponte. Compare Larson v. United States, 274 F.3d 643, 648 (1st Cir. 2001) (sovereign
immunity may be raised sua sponte), and Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("We believe that, because of its jurisdictional nature, a court ought to consider the issue
of Eleventh Amendment immunity at any time, even sua sponte."), with Wisc. Dep't of Corrs. v.
Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) ("Unless the State raises [sovereign immunity], a court can ignore
it."). For more on this debate, see Michelle Lawner, Comment, Why Federal Courts Should Be
Required to Consider State Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte, 66 U. CHi. L. REV. 1261 (1999).
48. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994) (ruling that "appellate review of qualified
immunity dispositions is to be conducted in light of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to,
or discovered by, the district court"). The question in this case was whether the precedent was raised
("unearthed") too late. One side argued that plaintiffs were required to put into the record all "legal
facts" just the same as other facts, or else forfeit them. Id. at 514. The Court held that the law is the
law, regardless of when it is raised, so courts must consider all relevant precedent, regardless of
timing. Id. at 516. But see Nelson v. Geringer, 295 F.3d 1082, 1098 n.16 (10th Cir. 2002)
(cataloging Supreme Court's inconsistency as to obligatory consideration of Eleventh Amendment
issues).
49. See, e.g., Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting inadequate
statement of Mexican law by party seeking its application; requesting further briefings by both sides
after oral argument; conducting independent research into Mexican law; urging use by district court
of flexible provision in FED. R. CIrv. P. 44.1 to determine issues of foreign law). This applies only
once the parties have raised the issue of application of foreign law-then the courts have an
obligation to look into the substantive foreign law. But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz Ag, 270 F.3d
144, 155 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that neither party urges application of federal law, both have agreed
to limit their options to Swiss or Pennsylvania law, and "[in general, we respect the choice of law
that parties agree upon to resolve their private disputes"); Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d
201, 205-06 (Ist Cir. 1988) (noting unanimous agreement among other circuits that there is no
obligation to require application of foreign law). The Carey court stated:
By their silence, the litigants' [sic] consent to having their dispute resolved according to the
law of the forum. This arrangement is not unwelcome from the court's perspective because
it is spared a complicated international choice-of-law problem and can apply law with
which it is more familiar. We do not see any harm in a court deferring to the litigants in
these circumstances.
Id at 206.
50. See, e.g., Fetish & Fantasy Halloween Ball, Inc. v. Ahem Rentals, Inc., 45 Fed. Appx. 585,
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may also have an obligation to participate more actively in forming, or at least
liberally construing, the arguments of pro se litigants.5' In contrast, though,
courts will rarely deem it appropriate to raise sua sponte, for example, the
issue of procedural defaults.52 There is a limitless variety of such matters that
fall into a gray area at present as to whether a court may, should, or must
consider them.53 An examination of the basis for these general principles may
lead to a better understanding of the broader picture. If we can determine
why, in these particular circumstances, the court is allowed, encouraged, or
required to be more actively involved in the adversary adjudicatory process, it
may become clear whether and why a court is or is not allowed to consider
any other arguments it comes up with independent of the parties'
presentations.
It is clear that a court has an obligation to involve itself actively in any
586 (9th Cir. 2002) (considering Pullman abstention sua sponte for first time on appeal, and finding
resolution governed by Supreme Court case not raised by either party); Ford Motor Co. v. Meredith
Motor Co., 257 F.3d 67, 71-72, 72 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that issue of abstention, raised by
parties below, but not addressed by the lower court, formed the crux of the dispute between the
parties, so it could be addressed by appellate court; also noting that "[i]n any event, a court may raise
the issue of abstention sua sponte") (emphasis added) (citing Pustell v. Lynn Pub. Schs., 18 F.3d 50,
51 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994)).
51. See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). In Cato, the
appellate court noted the propriety of the district court's handling of the case in attempting to
"identify any legally cognizable basis upon which plaintiff's claims may proceed." Id. at 1105. The
court stated: "On our own, we have tried to conceive of possibilities for stating a cognizable claim."
Id. Later the court explained further: "The complaint itself does not refer to any basis upon which
the United States might have consented to suit. However, because Cato was proceeding pro se, the
district court construed her papers liberally and surveyed the most likely authorities for waiver, but
found them unavailing." Id. at 1106. The court noted that while the appellant had been
unrepresented at the district court level, she was represented at the appellate level by counsel who did
make various additional suggestions for curative amendments to the complaint. Id. at 1107.
Nonetheless the court noted again in its conclusion its participation in the attempt to find a basis for
the complaint: "As the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to any of
Cato's theories of relief.., or any other source that we can identify. ... " Id. at 1111 (emphasis
added). While all courts are supposed to construe liberally the arguments of pro se litigants, it is not
clear how many would go quite so far in seeking out all possible theories of the case. There is at
least a clear end to this liberality of construction at the point in the proceedings at which the litigant
gets representation. See Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000) (construing pro se
notice of appeal liberally to allow consideration of prior orders not specifically raised by pro se
litigant, but ruling reply brief too late for litigant (who was represented by counsel as of his opening
brief) to raise new error).
52. See, e.g., Flood v. Phillips, No. 01-2249, 2004 WL 193164, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2004);
Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 868 (4th Cir. 2003).
53. One example here is a scenario that occurred in a Tenth Circuit case, in which the court
raised of its own accord a notice provision in a state statute involved in a case before it. See Aspen
Orthopaedics & Sports Med., LLC v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832, 838 (10th Cir. 2003).
The court explained that it did so because state case law provided that courts interpreting the statute
could do so. Id.
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aspect of the process that determines the propriety of its own role in the
dispute before it. In one way or another, all of the general principles listed
above can be viewed as jurisdictional questions. However, the reasoning
behind the court's obligation might take one of two paths. In a passive model
of judging, the court might embrace these general principles out of a concern
to avoid any involvement that is not necessary. An active approach, on the
other hand, would have the court inquire into these general principles of
jurisdiction out of a concern that the court reach the best answer, so it must
pursue and resolve all possible arguments to find that one best answer.
B. A Passive Approach
One popular model of judging analogizes the role of the judge to that of
an impartial umpire in a game.54  The rules of the game are already
established, and the judge must simply ensure that the parties follow the rules
and the better case prevails. In keeping with this concept, a passive approach
to what an appellate judge may consider might range anywhere from
absolutely forbidding any supplementary arguments to be raised by the judge
to requiring the full involvement of both parties in any further arguments the
court deems necessary. The most extreme practical version of this passive
model comes directly from an interpretation of the general rule that any issue
not raised below is automatically waived on appeal.55 Of course, that rule
applies to the parties, as distinct from the court itself, and applies more
specifically to "issues" than to legal reasons or arguments, but not all courts
have made such clear distinctions in practice. 56 If the reasoning behind a
court's refusal to consider any argument the parties have not raised is that the
court lacks sufficient information (either factual or legal) to reach a
considered judgment, a less extreme version of the passive approach, short of
54. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's
Role, 93 HARV. L. REv. 633, 638 (1980).
55. This version of the passive approach might also come with the corollary rule that where a
court does consider sua sponte an argument not raised by the parties, there is an automatic ground for
appeal. See Greenberg v. Comerica Bank, 229 F.3d 1163 (Table), Nos. 98-1349, 98-1366, 95-B-663,
2000 WL 1174625 at *2 n.5 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2000) ("[W]hen, as here, a court disposes of a case
on a point not argued by the parties, it is axiomatic that the parties may challenge that ruling and the
court's underlying analysis on appeal.").
56. See, e.g., Mauldin v. Worldcom, Inc., 263 F.3d 1205, 1211, 1211 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001)
(stating that "[blecause neither party argues that the option contracts are subject to [ERISA], we do
not consider ERISA in analyzing Mauldin's contract claims," but dropping footnote to add that "[i]t
is surprising that neither party briefed the issue whether ERISA governs [the agreements], especially
since at least one court has considered this to be a substantial question.") (emphasis added);
Westberry v. Principi, 255 F.3d 1377, 1380 n.l (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Neither party briefed or argued
whether Ms. Westberry's claim would be eligible for equitable tolling .... Thus, we decline to
decide that issue today.") (emphasis added).
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knowingly deciding the case with a blind eye to a potentially relevant
argument, would be to remand the case to the district court. 7 As mentioned
above, the court could request 58 or require 59 the submission of supplemental
briefs or oral arguments. 60  A similar approach might be to request a brief
from an amicus curiae. This does not happen often, but it does happen,
particularly when an appellate court wants to decide a case, but believes one
side to have been poorly argued.6'
57. See, e.g., United States v. McHan, 11 Fed. Appx. 304, 308 n.* (4th Cir. 2001) ("Neither
party in this case raised the issue of the applicability of this statute below and did not raise it in this
appeal until the date of oral argument. On remand, the district court should decide whether the
statute applies to this action."); Lani v. McDaniel, 23 Fed. Appx. 644, 644-45 (9th Cir. 2001)
("[N]either party has briefed these alternative grounds upon appeal, and we decline to reach them sua
sponte. Accordingly, we remand for further proceeding so that the district court may decide these
remaining questions."); Univ. of D.C. Faculty Ass'n. v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance
Auth., 163 F.3d 616, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[Blecause of the way the matter was initially presented,
neither party focused on the contractual issue in the District Court.... Prudence beckons, so we will
remand the contract claim to the District Court.").
58. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 825 (1997)
(requesting supplemental arguments on jurisdictional and statutory interpretation questions); Smith v.
Roper, 12 Fed. Appx. 393, 395-98 (7th Cir. 2001) (requesting supplemental arguments by parties,
but on not receiving any, proceeding to make decision without them); Providence Journal Co. v.
Providence Newspaper Guild, 271 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (requesting supplemental arguments on
jurisdictional question); United States v. Young, 266 F.3d 468, 475 n.8 (6th Cir. 2001) (requesting
supplemental arguments on jurisdictional question); Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc.,
244 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (requesting supplemental arguments on jurisdictional
question); Kuhai v. INS, 199 F.3d 909, 913-14 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that lower court erred by not
allowing alien to submit supplemental briefs on undeveloped issue of Ukrainian citizenship before
deciding issue).
59. See, e.g., Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 737 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that supplemental
issue could be relevant, but could not be resolved without briefing by parties); Kee v. City of
Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 217 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that supplemental issue could be relevant,
but could not be resolved without briefing by parties); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178
F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e do not reverse judgments in civil cases on the basis of grounds
not argued by the appellant at any stage of the litigation-grounds, therefore, that the appellee had no
opportunity to meet."); Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 630 F.2d 864, 867 (1st Cir. 1980)
(ordering supplemental briefs on issue of res judicata).
60. However, some courts will proceed without even requesting supplemental argument by the
parties, if they believe the issues are not dispositive or are easily resolved. See Galletta v. Deasy, 9
Fed. Appx. 909, 915 n.9 (10th Cir. 2001) (determining without supplemental arguments by the
parties (none were requested), that issue was not dispositive, and that unbriefed, though possibly
relevant, case was distinguishable).
61. See Alabama v. Shelton, 534 U.S. 987 (2001) (inviting an outside attorney, Charles Fried,
to submit an amicus brief and to argue in opposition to the judgment below, providing a narrowly
tailored position for which brief and argument should advocate, and allotting amicus ten minutes of
petitioner's time for oral argument); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534
U.S. 204, 226 n.1 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Because neither party defended [the lower
court] ruling in this Court... we appointed an amicus curiae to argue in support of the Ninth
Circuit's judgment."); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussed infra notes 79-88
and accompanying text); Resident Council of Allen Parkway Vill. v. U.S. Dep't of HUD, 980 F.2d
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Even a judge using a passive approach may find that there are exceptional
circumstances that allow the judge liberty to take a more active role in the
case than might ordinarily be countenanced. In extreme circumstances, for
example, a court might be able to note error where it has not been raised by
the parties.62
The passive model is concerned, above all else, with procedural fairness.
63
It works on the assumption that a good process is the best way to achieve
good and fair results. If all of the procedural standards are met, everything
should have been done correctly, and that affords the best possibility of
getting to the truth, and ultimately to the best "correct" answer. A judge who
interferes with the process by stepping out of the role of umpire and into the
role of adversarial participant by becoming involved in the fashioning of
arguments may risk upsetting the process and producing bad results. The
passive model is ultimately concerned that each player maintain his own role,
thereby affording a measure of consistency, predictability, and integrity that
may in some respects surpass a more active model. It is perhaps easier for an
adherent of the passive model to know what to do and how to do it. The judge
must stay within the boundaries established by the rules and traditional values
of procedure, strictly construed. However, the judge who so values process
will be left with little recourse, should he see those values obscuring a
1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that, absent exceptional circumstances, court is constrained only
by rule that amicus cannot expand scope of appeal to implicate issues not presented by parties), Note
that there is even some debate concerning how arguments of ordinary (i.e., not specially court-
requested) amici curiae are to be taken by the court.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 725 (1993) (noting in case syllabus that a
"court of appeals has discretion under Rule 52(b) to correct 'plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights' that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court, which it should
exercise only if the errors 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings"' and listing three limitations on appellate authority, which are (1) there must be an
error; (2) the error must be plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights) (quoting United
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976)
(acknowledging general rule against addressing issues not passed upon by lower court, but allowing
discretion to do so, particularly where proper resolution is beyond doubt, or injustice might otherwise
occur); Wright v. Hickman, 24 Fed. Appx. 990, 996 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[A]lthough it is rarely done,
an appellate court may, sua sponte, raise a dispositive issue of law when the proper resolution is
beyond doubt and the failure to raise the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.") (quoting
Counts v. Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc., 986 F.2d 1322,1325-26 (10th Cir. 1993)); United States
v. Portillo-Mendoza, 273 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Although neither party raised this issue,
'[iun exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest,
may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken ... ') (quoting United
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)); see also United States v. Arrous, 320 F.3d 355, 356
(2d Cir. 2003) (characterizing sua sponte consideration of harmless error doctrine as matter of
common sense).
63. This is the ultimate value on which Milani and Smith put most emphasis. See Milani &
Smith, supra note 4.
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substantively superior result in the matter before him. As the Supreme Court
has stated, form should not defeat justice:
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of
justice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared
practice under which courts of review would invariably and under all
circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not
previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this
policy. Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules
of fundamental justice.6 4
As another caution, the Court has stated that it would be improper to leave
the administration of criminal law to the stipulation of the parties, which
indicates an aversion to an entirely passive model.65
C. An Active Approach
The various practical approaches in the passive model can in some ways
blend over into the category of active approaches. That is, one might see a
request for supplemental briefs, or the use of discretion, even in very limited
circumstances, to be the mark of an active, rather than a spectatorial judge.66
Another example that might fall on either side of the line is the situation in
which a judge affirms the lower court, but does so on a different theory.6 7
That the result remains unchanged might call for a passive characterization,
but the effort to correct the reasoning is surely a sign of active judicial
participation in the case-a particular concern to reach the best result.
68
64. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).
65. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942).
66. One example of these contrasting views appears in Warren v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 282 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). The majority opinion defended as standard careful
procedure its request for supplemental briefs both by the parties and an amicus on what it considered
to be a necessary antecedent issue to the one explicitly presented by the parties. Id. at 1120-22. The
dissent criticized the request for supplemental briefs to address the new issue as unacceptable
activism on the part of the judges. Id. at 1123-24 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., Loftis v. UPS, Inc., 342 F.3d 509, 514 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that court is free to
affirm for any reason, whether or not presented by parties, and therefore finding removal was
defective, though not raised by either party).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Ripplinger, 14 Fed. Appx. 720, 721 (8th Cir. 2001) (arguing that
where there is no change in result, the activism should not be considered erroneous); United States v.
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994) ("We are free to affirm a district court decision on
any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not
relied upon by the district court.") (quoting Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493,
1495 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1992)). Another situation that may fall into this same category is that in which
the court sees an issue that would not change the result, but should be addressed, even though not
raised by the parties, because it is an important question of law. See, e.g., Kosakow v. New Rochelle
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A truly active model, however, would extend beyond the bounds of such
potential overlap. At the extreme, an active model might make it a
requirement that the court seek out the correct or best answer, whether it is
one presented by the parties or one the judge raises of his own accord.69 This
clearly departs from the realm of discretion, however aspirational. It raises
theoretical questions about the duty of the judge as well as practical questions
about how exactly the judge is expected to manage such an undertaking. A
judge in such a position might call in his own expert, request an amicus brief,
undertake his own research,7 ° or call on his own past experiences to find the
best legal reasoning or best legal argument, to support the correct decision in
the case. A less extreme approach might not require or aspire to perfection in
all cases, but at least in those cases in which manifest injustice would
otherwise occur.7 1
Regardless of its precise scope, an active approach raises fairness
concerns, if the parties are not involved. Two general rules may shed some
light on the fairness issue. First, courts generally do not look favorably upon
arguments raised by parties at the eleventh hour-for example, at oral
72argument . The reason for disfavoring the presentation of new arguments at
Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 728 (2d Cir. 2001). Finally, there may be cases in which a court
notes that it need not address an issue that was not raised, but also notes that if it were to be
addressed, it would bolster the court's decision. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 248 F.3d 777,
780 n.2 (8th Cir. 2001).
69. Indeed, there is some indication of the desirability of such an end in cases addressing those
scenarios in which the court is presented by the parties with new arguments on appeal. One of the
major considerations proposed for such cases is "whether resolution of the new issue will materially
advance the.., litigation." Jackson v. Holland, 80 Fed. Appx. 392, 405 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir. 1988)) (unpublished
decision) (considering also whether parties have presented issue with sufficient clarity and
completeness).
70. Courts sometimes explicitly indicate that they have done independent research. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morris, 259 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Neither party nor our own research has
led us to any statutory authority that empowers the court .... ) (emphasis added); Jutzi-Johnson v.
United States, 263 F.3d 753, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding parties' research into case law
inadequate, so conducting independent research to find correct case law).
71. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 394 (9th Cir.
2003); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting principle applies only where
manifest injustice is more than just possible, and stressing outcome could have been easily avoided
by the party in question here); see also, e.g., DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 926 (8th Cir.
2000) (applying FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b)).
72. See Cubic Def. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 450 (1999). In Cubic, the court
recounted that Cubic devoted the entire time for oral argument to "a new argument never briefed,"
including references to four cases not contained in briefs. Id. at 457. The court noted that "[a]ny
experienced appellate litigator knows that issues not raised in a brief are waived." Id. at 467. The
court reasoned that the agreement across the circuits on this point is grounded in "the unfairness
resulting from arguing issues that have not been briefed." Id. The court stated that any exceptions to
this rule would be at the absolute discretion of the court, but that if the new argument were allowed,
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a late date is the court's concern for fairness. If one side "ambushes" the
other with an argument, it would be unfair to decide the issue without
allowing sufficient time for the preparation of a response. It seems only
logical that if the universally accepted duty of the judge were to find the
correct answer, it would be most important to ensure that all potentially
relevant legal arguments have been presented. Simply changing the facts so
that it is a judge, rather than one of the parties, who brings in a new argument
at the eleventh hour does not avoid the fairness argument.
Second, courts generally do not take it upon themselves to rearrange the
lawsuit before them so that the plaintiffs will get the most effective relief
available to them. They do not fix those situations in which the plaintiff has,
for example, sued the wrong party, sued under the wrong statute, or failed to
request the most suitable form of relief.73  Even at the appellate stage, the
plaintiff is master of his own complaint.74 Thus, there may be situations in
which a court can see the "best" or most correct outcome of the case in the
larger scheme of things, but is restrained from leading the parties to that
precise scenario. The reasoning here might also be based on grounds of
fairness to the parties (i.e., the judge should not be participating or helping the
parties because he is supposed to be an impartial arbiter), efficient allocation
of resources (i.e., dockets are crowded enough without judges taking the time
the court "would have to allow the other side sufficient time to prepare and present a response." Id.
The court concluded its discussion on this point as follows:
We decline to undergo the legal gymnastics of characterizing Cubic's arguments as
anything but "too late."... [Cubic] conducted litigation by ambush, pure and simple, and
not for the first time in this case. Accordingly, we find that plaintiffs ... [new] claims are
out of order. We disapprove of this kind of tactic and believe it negates the entire concept
behind the modem system of civil litigation. Still, at the risk of seeming to condone
Cubic's behavior, we discuss the arguments briefly, if for no other reason than to show
how futile they are.
Id.
73. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied 385 U.S. 960 (1966) (denying relief on appeal from denial of injunction without offering
to rescue plaintiffs from failure to seek a stay or an appellate injunction); Downey v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 266 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2001) (pointing out that regulation relied upon allows direct
action against different person from the one plaintiff sued, but that plaintiff is "stuck with that
choice" rather than suggesting possibly more effective course, writ of mandamus, to get injunction
directly from appellate court); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir.
1996) (denying relief on appeal of temporary restraining order because TRO was not appealable
order, but not suggesting or offering the equivalent relief available by means of writ of mandamus).
This failure to assist the parties is noted by both the concurrence and the dissent, id. at 228 (Martin,
J., concurring), 231-32 (Brown, J., dissenting), while the majority argues in response that that option
would prove inapplicable, id. at 224. But see Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.
1995) (liberally construing complaint ofpro se litigant).
74. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 512 (1989).
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to rearrange, reargue, and perfect all of the cases before them), or even
curbing abuse of state power.
Thus, it is difficult to make the extreme argument that judges must find
the right answer and reach the best result at any cost or by any means.75
However, having abandoned that absolute requirement, it becomes even more
difficult to discover, from the indications of recent case law, any other
objective or clear measure of the duty of an appellate judge. If the courts are
to be left only with a discretionary standard, where can lines be drawn as to
what they may or may not (or indeed must or must not) undertake? A general
survey of appellate case law reveals predictably inconsistent approaches to the
problem, and in many cases, no explicit explanation of the reasoning
underlying a particular court's approach to the problem.
As with the passive approach, it will be helpful to explore the underlying
concept of the approach to better understand its practical application. Again,
that concept is based on a particular kind of fairness, but in this case, it is
substantive, rather than procedural fairness that lies at the heart of the
practical approach. The participatory model of appellate judging is concerned
primarily with reaching the best result, however that must be achieved.76
Thus the participatory judge is not as constrained by procedural boundaries
between the roles of the various players. The values of process give way to a
concern with substance. This balancing of values reveals an inherent problem
of the conceptual model: The participatory approach suffers from a difficulty
of defining limits on how far a judge may stray into the traditional role of the
adversarial party, and in what manner it is appropriate to do so.
There is a key distinction between the problems of the two approaches.
Whereas the conceptual modeling of the passive approach suffers from the
inability to adjust to the situation in which the model does not work, the flaw
in the more active approach is more susceptible of a remedy. The remedy
75. One opinion in the Eighth Circuit treated this fairness question as a constitutional issue of
procedural due process. Jenkins v. Missouri, 216 F.3d 720, 726 (8th Cir. 2000). The district court
had determined sua sponte a question that neither party had any expectation was an issue to be tried.
Id at 725. The Eighth Circuit looked to a Seventh Circuit opinion in which Judge Posner
disapproved of such judicial involvement in shaping the litigation. Id. at 725-26 (citing United
States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 128 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 1997), discussed further infra note 150). The
Eighth Circuit stated that due process requires no less than notice to the parties and an opportunity to
prepare for a hearing on the issue. Id. at 726-27. The court thus remanded the case to the district
court. Id. at 727. The dissenters in the case, however, characterized the district court's action as a
sensible one that was not undertaken without sufficient factual evidence, and that would efficiently
dispose of a fifteen-year-old case without an additional hearing. Id. at 735 (Beam, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)) (mentioning fairness concerns along with concerns
about need for finality and importance of district court's awareness of issue, but noting waiver rule is
not inflexible and room is left for exercise of discretion).
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simply requires the establishment and acceptance of certain boundaries, with
an attendant expectation of some flexibility in their application. Obviously
this does not solve the problem entirely-it leaves some ambiguity as to
boundaries in the practical application-but it goes some distance towards a
practical compromise between the objects of substantive and procedural
fairness. That is, both of these fairness values strive for the same ultimate
goal: the most correct answer to the problem at hand, but they rely on
different mechanisms to reach that goal. The mechanism employed by the
procedural fairness approach affords no such opportunity for compromise or
the necessary flexibility for reaching the common goal of the right answer.
To the extent that safeguards are necessary in the active approach, at least
two possibilities are immediately apparent. First, a party who believes that a
court's newly interjected argument was incorrect may petition for rehearing-
a procedural right with no associated fee. 7  Second, a judge who is
particularly concerned that the new argument or new reasoning might benefit
from more involvement by the parties might offer them a limited amount of
time to brief the new argument, or indeed might require them to brief and
argue the new argument.
A survey of federal appellate case law thus demonstrates a broad range of
approaches. It is difficult to glean from this material how any one of those
theories or practical applications might play out beyond any one of the cases
cited above or the particular panel of judges who wrote it. Thus the following
section focuses further in on a case study of a few judges on the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to better understand how courts'
and individual judges' theories and practices play out.
D. Case Study: Working Approaches of Three Federal Appellate Judges
Perhaps the most effective way of bringing out the practical and
theoretical facets of this debate is to look at the way a handful of judges have
dealt with such questions in the cases before them. To that end, this section
presents the approaches and theories of three judges from the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as far as they can be
discerned from the language used and courses of action taken in their
opinions.78 It begins by looking at the debate not even about what arguments
77. See FED. R. APP. P. 40. Note, however, that in most circumstances, unless the court
requests it, an answer is not permitted when a petition for rehearing is filed. FED. R. APP. P.
40(a)(3).
78. The selection of these judges was originally based on the neatly opposing views of Judge
Sentelle and Judge Ginsburg in the Eldred opinions. From there, I simply looked for a middle road
between the two from among the D.C. Circuit judges, and came up with Judge Edwards. None of
these judges has, to my knowledge, written explicitly on his personal views on this question.
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the court may raise sua sponte, but what arguments the court may consider
when they are presented by amici curiae (i.e., non-parties to the litigation),
although the opinions do touch on both scenarios. With that as background,
the Part goes on to compare the different working approaches of three of the
judges as they bear on the further question of what a court may raise on its
own, as well as why and how it should do so.
The District of Columbia Circuit has expressed contrasting views on the
subject in two relatively recent opinions. In Eldred v. Reno, the majority
opinion devoted an entire section of its discussion of the merits to its response
to the dissent's arguments about the use of arguments offered by amici. 79
Judge Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated that an argument contained in
an amicus brief was not properly before the court because it had been
expressly disavowed by the actual parties to the case. 80 Judge Ginsburg
supported this view with comments on the importance of the avoidance
doctrine and the fairness issue concerning notice to the other side of the need
to argue on a given point (because the argument had been disavowed by the
actual party-opponent). 81 Judge Sentelle, writing in dissent, vigorously
disagreed. 82 Judge Sentelle argued that the majority was wrong to believe his
reading of the precedential case at issue was "foreclosed by the fact that it
accepts the argument of an amicus. 8 3 He noted that "[n]either [he] nor the
amicus raise any issue not raised by the parties to the case, nor disposed of by
a majority of the court., 84  He continued: "That the amicus argues more
convincingly in appellants' favor on the issue raised by the appellants than
[the appellants] do themselves is no reason to reject the argument of the
amicus."8 5 He pointed to D.C. Circuit Rule 29, which provides that an amicus
brief must avoid repetition of legal arguments made in the principal brief, and
must focus on points not made or adequately elaborated upon in the principal
79. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378-80 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (titling one section of opinion "Ill.
The Dissent").
80. Id. at 378.
81. Id. (citing Resident Council of Allen Parkway Vill. v. HUD, 980 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir.
1993); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1989); and Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
82. It is perhaps noteworthy here that the majority and dissent disagree not only as to the role of
amici, but also as to the basic interpretation of the precedent at issue in the question before the court.
Eldred, 239 F.3d 372 passim. They disagree over the proper way to construe Schnapper v. Foley,
667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which deals with copyright law, but Judge Sentelle, in his dissent,
notes that as regards the disagreement over the role of amici, "it does not matter if I disagree with the
language ofSchnapper." Eldred, 239 F.3d at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
83. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 383.
84. Id. See also further general discussion of the role of court rules, supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
85. Id.
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brief.86 Judge Sentelle continued by drawing a distinction between issues and
arguments-an amicus may not expand the appeal to implicate new issues,
but may certainly add new arguments.87  Judge Sentelle then quoted the
language of Kamen to underscore the absence of limitations on legal theories
that courts may consider.88
The dispute did not end with this opinion. Five months later, the same
panel reiterated its respective positions when denying a petition for rehearing,
and for rehearing en banc.89 Once again, Judge Ginsburg, for the majority,
stressed that the plaintiff-appellants in the case had adopted a position
diametrically opposed to that of the amicus, and had expressly disavowed the
amicus' argument at oral argument. 90 This, Judge Ginsburg again argued,
deprived the government of the opportunity to argue against the point at issue,
and thus resulted in the absence of meaningful argument on that point.
91
Judge Sentelle, joined by Judge Tatel in the dissent from the denial of
rehearing en banc, reiterated his previous argument as well, but with a new
focus-Judge Sentelle demonstrated extreme concern about the precedent this
case would create for amici in the D.C. Circuit.92 Judge Sentelle wrote:
Merely because the parties fail to advance the proper legal theory
underlying their claim does not-indeed cannot-prevent a court from
arriving at the proper legal disposition. Once the issue is raised, a
court has an obligation to determine what the law is which will govern
the case at hand. This is so irrespective of whether amici curiae enter
an appearance.93
86. Id.
87. Id. at 383-84. This debate plays, of course, directly into the debate about ownership of law.
88. Id. at 384.
89. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
90. Id. at 850-51.
91. Id. at 851.
92. Id. at 852 ("[P]rocedurally, the Court's opinion in this case effectively eliminates any role
for amicus curiae [sic] in the practice of this circuit .... "). Judge Sentelle continued on this point
later in the dissent:
Under the panel's holding, it is now the law of this circuit that amici are precluded both
from raising new issues and from raising new arguments. If allowed to stand, this holding
will effectively bar future amici from adding anything except possibly rhetorical flourish to
arguments already outlined and embraced by the parties. This is particularly the case for
those amici who, true to their traditional role as "friends of the court," operate
independently to assist the Court in its determinations. If this Court is to adopt such a
rule-and I hope we do not-we should do so sitting en banc, not by a divided panel.
Id. at 854 (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 853.
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Thus, these opinions indicate a genuine split of opinion on the role of the
court in the question presented by this Article.
1. Judge Sentelle
The opinions written by Judge David Sentelle, of the D.C. Circuit,
indicate a basic philosophy that the judge's task is to find the best possible
theory of law on which to decide the case.94 If the parties do not themselves
argue that theory, but it is known to the judge, the judge should decide the
case on the most correct theory regardless of the parties' failure to argue it.
Under Judge Sentelle's approach, it appears that the judge need not
necessarily present a newly introduced theory to the parties or request
supplemental briefing prior to rendering a decision based on that point.95 Of
course, if the judge does not, in considering the arguments explicitly
presented by the parties, perceive a defect or omission in the briefs or
arguments, and the judge knows of no better theory of law on which to decide
the case, there is no apparent obligation to conduct independent research to
ensure that the best theory has been presented. Rather, in this view the judge
simply retains the discretion to use a theory not argued by the parties.96
Judge Sentelle's opinions appear to endorse a rather aggressive use of that
discretion. This approach might be based on a basic concept of the judge as
determiner of the law in its broader sense, not just as between the parties to a
94. Judge Sentelle's opinion for the majority in United States v. Harrison, 204 F.3d 236 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (see discussion supra note 22), as well as his dissents in Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (see discussion supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text) and Eldred v. Ashcroft,
255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (see discussion supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text)
demonstrate his basic approach. Judge Sentelle does note at least one limitation on the need to
decide the case on the most correct theory of law, in that if there is already developed "law of the
case" it cannot ordinarily be changed by the appellate court, regardless of the court's different
conception of issues or arguments, unless there are particularly compelling circumstances. See Lever
Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
95. See United States v. Paxson, 861 F.2d 730, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that "[n]either
party has cited any case applying the work-product privilege to facts paralleling those in this record,"
presenting cases court itself has found to be relevant, and noting "we think that the principles laid
down in [the cases we cited] are perfectly applicable to the facts present here").
96. In line with the discretion to use another theory or argument, a judge may also, under Judge
Sentelle's approach, address an issue not raised by the parties if that issue is antecedent to those
already properly before the court. See Global NAPS, Inc. v. FCC, 247 F.3d 252, 256 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (noting that FCC's pleading requirements "bar a complainant from amending or otherwise
'introducing new issues late in the development of the case,"' but finding nonetheless that the legal
theories involved were antecedent to those presented). "Though the precise legal theories relied upon
by the Commission were different than those raised by Verizon, GNAPs cannot credibly argue that
the effect of the ongoing state proceeding on GNAPs' tariff and Verizon's payment obligations was
not squarely before the agency." Id. at 257.
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given suit.97 That is, it is important that the judge not issue an opinion based
on bad law, simply because the lawyers did not do a good job of arguing.98
Judge Sentelle's approach promotes efficiency. Judicial resources cannot, as
a practical matter, afford unlimited time for supplemental briefing of cases, so
if a judge can provide a correct answer quickly, he will avoid further delay
and thereby gain time for other pending matters. There is a fairness issue
inherent in this last point, but one might also argue that if the parties did not
present the issue or argument to the court in the first place, they may be
considered to have waived their opportunity to do so. Judge Sentelle might
say more specifically that if the court is going to affirm the lower court result,
even if on a different rationale, there is no need to raise the issue before the
parties. 99 On the other hand, Judge Sentelle does not appear to object to the
option of remand to the district court for resolution of the issue the appellate
court thought should be addressed. 100
97. Though this seems a likely conclusion to draw about Judge Sentelle's reasoning, there is at
least one curious example to bring it into question. In a case in which Judge Sentelle did not agree
with the majority on the denial of a suggestion for rehearing en banc, he also did not join the dissent
of Judge Silberman, whose opinion appears to present the position often taken by Judge Sentelle.
See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 3 F.3d 1555, 1556, 1559-68 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Silberman wrote, in dissent:
To be sure, it does appear that both parties litigated the case on the assumption that the
statute's amendment.., was of no significance. It is certainly understandable, therefore,
that the panel majority and the dissenting judge would not have focused on the possibility
of a limiting construction of the statute. We need not, however, ignore the actual language
of the statute in order to resolve the dispute the parties put before us. [Silberman cited
Indep. Ins. Agents]... Indeed, we had previously recognized our particular obligation to
consider an argument not precisely raised if to do so avoids a constitutional issue.
Id. at 1562 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
98. Judge Sentelle does not, however, take this so far as to fix procedural mistakes made by the
parties in the lower court. For example, he would not correct or overlook a party's failure to move
below for substitution of another party. See Peralta v. U.S. Attorney's Office, 136 F.3d 169, 171
(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[r]ejecting the government's attempt to rewrite the history of this case").
Similarly, he will not hear objections to procedure that were not made below. See United States v.
Paxson, 861 F.2d 730, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to hear suggestion concerning in camera
examination of certain memoranda because suggestion had not been made to trial court).
99. See Danielsen v. Bumside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc., 941 F.2d 1220, 1230 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (noting that appellant was incorrect in believing court to be restricted to the original ground of
decision in such a case, noting failure of appellant to respond to the other argument in its reply brief,
and stating that "if appellants have a response to [the other] argument, they would have done well to
have asserted it. Apparently they have none.").
100. See Peralta, 136 F.3d at 173 (noting that "because the government raised this argument
for the first time on appeal, we shall not consider it .... The government is free to reassert this
argument on remand if it desires.").
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2. Judge Ginsburg
Opinions issued by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, also of the D.C. Circuit,
present the idea that the judge's primary task is to ensure that the process of
adjudication is fair. In deference to fairness concerns, the judge should not
decide a case on a ground other than one argued by the parties.'0 1 Judge
Ginsburg would go so far as to limit this strictly to the parties themselves,
leaving aside even those arguments presented by amici curiae, regardless of
the importance of any arguments that would thereby be omitted. 0 2 The judge
may circumvent this fairness problem by requesting and receiving for
consideration supplemental briefs from the parties on the point the judge
would like to raise. 0 3 Another solution would be to flag the new issue and
send the case back to the district court for resolution.'0 4  Finally, the court
could simply leave the issue or argument out of the case entirely. 0 5 Judge
101. Justice Scalia, when he was on the D.C. Circuit, wrote an opinion that agrees emphatically
with this position. See Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1983). His rhetoric deserves
repetition here. Having stated that the court will not resolve an issue that was not adequately briefed
or argued on appeal, he wrote: "The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not
sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions
presented and argued by the parties before them." Id. at 177. At this point, he invoked Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(4), which requires all contentions to be contained in the brief. Id. He
continued:
Failure to enforce this requirement will ultimately deprive us in substantial measure of that
assistance of counsel which the system assumes-a deficiency that we can perhaps supply
by other means, but not without altering the character of our institution. Of course not all
legal arguments bearing upon the issue in question will always be identified by counsel...
through our own deliberation and research. But where counsel has made no attempt to
address the issue, we will not remedy the defect, especially where, as here, "important
questions of far-reaching significance" are involved.
Id. (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
102. See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. Circuit controversy over
use of arguments by amici).
103. See Conn. Valley Elec. Co. v. FERC, 208 F.3d 1037, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(requesting oral argument on issue not raised by either party, concerning jurisdiction of appellate
court to adjudicate in first instance dispute arising under particular section of statute; finding that it
would be usurpation of district court role to address in first instance).
104. See FEC v. Int'l Funding Inst., Inc., 969 F.2d 1110, 1113, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(remanding case in which court thought "neither party ha[d] it quite right"). Judge Edwards
concurred in this judgment, but did not speak separately to the issue of remand. Id. at 1119
(Edwards, J., concurring).
105. See Flynn v. Comm'r of IRS, 269 F.3d 1064, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Because appellants
did not raise this argument at the Tax Court, we decline to address it now."). Another area in which a
court may simply ignore an issue that has not been raised is that of choice of law. Parties'
agreements as to choice of law may be accepted by the court without question. See Tidier v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 851 F.2d 418, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that neither party has argued that law of other
jurisdictions should apply, so court may assume that is correct). It is perhaps worth noting that in the
same case, Judge Ginsburg also noted that a late request (i.e., one not made at the District Court) for
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Ginsburg's framework of practical approaches seems to be based on concepts
of basic fairness, (including issues of notice, expectations, etc.), prudence
(similar to an avoidance theory of not deciding constitutional issues unless
absolutely necessary), caution (so that courts will make fewer mistakes), and
finally preservation of resources (because courts lack the time, money, or
personnel to conduct extra research).
3. Judge Edwards
Judge Harry Edwards, also of the D.C. Circuit, might present a middle
road between Judge Ginsburg and Judge Sentelle. He acknowledges several
areas in which the courts should take up issues that the parties have not raised
of their own accord-jurisdiction and sovereign immunity are two
examples. 10 6 However, he has also often found that in other areas the court
need not address issues or arguments not raised below.'0 7 For example, in the
area of conflicts of law, he urges that the courts should leave these issues
alone if the parties do not dispute them. 10 8 Basically, Judge Edwards's
approach entails a two-step process: first, a determination about whether the
argument is properly before the court, and second, a determination about
whether to consider it. 109 Overall, if the issue is pertinent, his view seems to
certification of questions to various states whose jurisdiction applies would not be granted,
particularly when the court had no genuine uncertainty about a question of state law before it. Id. at
425-26.
106. See, e.g., Rubins Contractors, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 821 F.2d 671, 673 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (noting court's "independent obligation to determine whether jurisdiction was proper");
Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 719 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that neither party has raised
sovereign immunity, but as it bears on court's jurisdiction, court raises it sua sponte).
107. Flynn v. Comm'r of IRS, 269 F.3d 1064, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Because appellants did
not raise this argument at the Tax Court, we decline to address it now."); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v.
NLRB, 253 F.3d 125, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Honeywell did not raise the availability of grievance
procedures and arbitration before the Board and no 'extraordinary circumstances' have been cited to
excuse this failure. Therefore, this court cannot consider the argument."); United States v. Smith,
232 F.3d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that court need not reach substance of new argument not
raised at trial concerning admission of evidence, but instead reviews admission only for plain error).
108. See Ekstrom v. Value Health Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that parties
have explicitly (and carefully) agreed to choice of governing substantive law, neither party argues for
application of any other law, and District of Columbia choice of law doctrine generally allows parties
to specify applicable law, as long as relationship between parties bears reasonable relation to state
specified).
109. See Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, Inc. v. FERC, 268 F.3d 1105, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Judge Edwards explained:
[T]he failure of FERC to challenge a petitioner's objection on the ground that it was
not raised below does not remove this court's independent obligation to determine whether,
in fact, the argument is properly before us.
Many of the objections raised by Wabash in its petition for review were not raised in
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be that the best course is not to ignore it, but to point it out and remand to the
lower court for resolution." 0 While he has cited the proposition that an issue
is waived or moot if not raised,' he has tempered that with the caution that if
an issue is important enough to make him reluctant to find it "waived" or
"forfeit[ed]," he would "happily eschew the task of wandering through the
maze of District of Columbia law," for example, and so would remand to the
district court."
12
the first instance in an application for rehearing to FERC. The court therefore has no
jurisdiction to consider these objections....
There is one claim that has been raised by Wabash that may be considered by the
court even though it was not raised below. Wabash contends that FERC's merger was
inconsistent with a subsequently released staff report. Though not raised in the application
for rehearing by Wabash, this argument may be properly considered by this court because
the Federal Power Act allows consideration of arguments raised for the first time on appeal
if "there is reasonable ground for failure" to raise objections in the request for rehearing.
Because this report was issued ... several months after Wabash's rehearing request, this
court has jurisdiction to review this challenge by Wabash.
Id. (citations omitted).
110. See Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (responding to criticism of
concurring judge regarding consideration of argument not explicitly raised). Judge Wald, in her
concurrence, expressed the following concern about the court's approach:
I worry that second-guessing the parties and counsel on the primary analytic mode for their
challenges causes unnecessary confusion and uncertainty among administrative law
practitioners. I think a court should refrain from reframing or abandoning the issues raised
by the parties unless their formulations are frivolous or misconceived. Otherwise we are
posing the questions, and then answering them ourselves without help from counsel.
Generally, courts ought to stick closely to the issues raised and the arguments made by
counsel, and I would have done so here by resolving this case under the Chevron mode of
analysis.
Id. at 620-21 (Wald, J., concurring). Judge Edwards responded as follows:
In view of these indications that the parties contemplated the application of arbitrary and
capricious review in this case, we disagree that, by deciding this case under State Farm, we
are in any way "second-guessing the parties" or "reframing" the issues so as to decide this
case on grounds not raised or argued by the parties.
Id. at 615 n.4.
111. See Teledesic LLC v. FCC, 275 F.3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that when agency
issued new order relevant to party's claims prior to oral argument, and party did not file petition for
reconsideration, claims would be considered moot and court would not address them). This is
distinct, however, from those situations in which the court simply declines to reach further implicated
issues-that is, issues that are subsequent to or related to, rather than antecedent to, those explicitly
raised by the parties. See, e.g., Local 2578, Am. Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Gen. Servs. Admin.,
711 F.2d 261, 267 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Because the issue is not before us, we need not decide the
extent to which the parties may limit arbitral authority to mitigate employer-imposed penalties.").
112. See Univ. of D.C. Faculty Ass'n/NEA v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance
Auth., 163 F.3d 616, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding to lower court for further argument on
point not addressed before appeal). Judge Edwards wrote:
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These approaches within the D.C. Circuit indicate the variety of views
from the appellate bench." 3  They also begin to demonstrate the
jurisprudential concepts from which those approaches develop. The next Part
will turn to a further exploration of the jurisprudential concepts themselves.
III. JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORIES
Another place in which we might expect to find an answer to the question
In this case ... because of the way the matter was initially presented, neither party focused
on the contractual issue in the District Court.... In these circumstances, we are loath to
find that appellants "waived" anything; indeed, all that may be at issue here is a possible
"forfeiture" of the exhaustion defense. In any event, we happily eschew the temptation to
wander through the maze of District of Columbia law-to cut fine lines between futility,
forfeiture, waiver, exhaustion, and jurisdiction-when a less indulgent course is apparent.
Prudence beckons, so we will remand the contract claim to the District Court.
Id. at 625 (citations omitted); see also GAO v. GAO Pers. Appeals Bd., 698 F.2d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (remanding case on issues requiring further consideration by personnel appeals board). As
noted above, while sitting on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Antonin Scalia urged an approach similar to
that presented by Judge Edwards. See Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 172, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(arguing that court should not resolve issues implicated in cases if not adequately briefed or argued
on appeal). Scalia wrote:
The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed
boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented
and argued by the parties before them. [Scalia raised Rule 28(a)(4), which requires all
contentions to be contained in the brief.] Failure to enforce this requirement will ultimately
deprive us in substantial measure of that assistance of counsel which the system assumes-
a deficiency that we can perhaps supply by other means, but not without altering the
character of our institution. Of course not all legal arguments bearing upon the issue in
question will always be identified by counsel, and we are not precluded from
supplementing the contentions of counsel through our own deliberation and research. But
where counsel has made no attempt to address the issue, we will not remedy the defect,
especially where, as here, "important questions of far-reaching significance" are involved.
Id. at 177 (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Sitting on the
Supreme Court a decade later, Justice Scalia characterized the decision of the court whether to
consider additional arguments as a matter of "prudence." See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,
465 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. Just before this Article went to press, the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion that demonstrates
the extent to which these questions are alive and well and not limited to the three judges examined
here. In United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., No. 98CV00657 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27,
2004), Judge Roberts, writing for himself and Judge Rogers, asserted the impropriety of employing
an argument put forward not by the parties (or even an amicus), but by the third judge on the panel.
Judge Garland, writing in dissent, seems more inclined toward the view that the priority is to reach
the best-reasoned decision. Indeed, as he notes, having requested and received supplemental briefing
form the parties on the argument Judge Garland raised sua sponte, the court has eliminated any
potential fairness concerns.
Due to the timing of publication, it is not possible to incorporate further discussion of this case
into this Article, but it does demonstrate the continuing vitality of this debate.
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of the role of the judge is in the work of scholars of jurisprudence. Perhaps
with a deeper understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of the
possible active or passive approaches, it may be clearer how to develop a
workable and practical approach. Not all of the scholars whose views are
canvassed here have written directly to the question of the appellate judge's
role, but some of their views may be gleaned from writings on related
subjects.
A. Aspirations of Perfection
Ronald Dworkin comes the closest of any of these jurisprudential theorists
to declaring that there is a "right" answer to a given legal question and that a
judge should actively pursue that precise answer. Judges, according to
Dworkin, have the task of continually perfecting the law, building on what has
come before, to make the developing law the best that it can be.'1 4 This is an
active model he calls "law as integrity."''1 5 It focuses on "fit" and on the
coherence of the law as a whole. Dworkin would have a judge look for a fit
both with past cases and with the specific area of law at issue and consider
with deference any "local priority" that may exist. 1 6 Furthermore, there is
Dworkin's concept of foundational "principles" that make up the coherent
body of law into which a case should be made to fit. 17 These principles are,
however, at times difficult to distinguish from normative value statements.'
18
This, along with the idea of certain local priorities, may be an avenue in
Dworkin's approach for the introduction of those individual views of the
judge that may inform his view of a case. Indeed, Dworkin acknowledges
that often judges will unthinkingly rely on instinct or feel for a particular
114. RONALD DwORKN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239 (1986).
115. Id. at 225, 225-75. Dworkin states:
Law as integrity asks judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured
by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and procedural due process, and it
asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each person's
situation is fair and just according to the same standards.
Id. at 243.
116. Id. at 250-54.
117. Unlike the pragmatists, Dworkin states that "[j]udges must make their common-law
decisions on grounds of principle, not policy." Id. at 244. He distinguishes principle from policy,
broadly speaking, by defining policy as something narrower in its application than a principle. Id. at
221-24. It is not entirely clear where Dworkin draws the line in practice, however, between
foundational descriptive legal principles and normative value statements. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt,
The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 627-28 (1987) (noting
fuzziness of Dworkin's distinction between legal standards and moral standards).
118. See DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 240-41. Dworkin labels these "interpretations," but it is
difficult to differentiate them from what he labels "principles."
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judgment, rather than a strictly legal analysis.19
Dworkin's model thus endorses no apparent limits as to what may enter
into the decisionmaking process, so judges are presumably not limited to
consideration only of what the parties present to the court. Despite his avowal
of the existence of a right answer, Dworkin acknowledges that even having
accepted the model of law as integrity, a judge may simply disagree with
other judges.120 These ideas together demonstrate Dworkin's appreciation of
the circumstances in which a judge may find himself when the parties present
plausible arguments, but the judge can think of a better one.
For the purpose of demonstrating the workings of his model, Dworkin
posits a fictional character. Judge Hercules "is a careful judge, a judge of
method. He begins by setting out various candidates for the best
interpretation of the precedent cases even before he reads them.,' 121 Dworkin
acknowledges at the outset that his Judge Hercules does not exist, and
therefore cannot be the true model for judges. 122 However, there would be
little point in using the example of Hercules if Dworkin did not believe that
judges should at least attempt as much as practicable in the way of being
actively involved in the pursuit of the best version of the legal answer they
can attain in the cases before them. 23  Dworkin advises as much in the
following statement:
But an actual judge can imitate Hercules in a limited way. He can
allow the scope of his interpretation to fan out from the cases
immediately in point to cases in the same general area or department
of law, and then still farther, so far as this seems promising. In
practice even this limited process will be largely unconscious: an
experienced judge will have a sufficient sense of the terrain
119. Id. at 256. While Dworkin does not purport to encourage the injection of personal views
into a judge's consideration of a case before him, he acknowledges that the personal will, almost
inevitably, creep in. Id. at 255-56. This idea might find a parallel in Cardozo's statement that:
There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or
not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot escape that
current any more than other mortals. All their lives, forces which they do not recognize
and cannot name, have been tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs,
acquired convictions; and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs, a
sense in James's phrase of "the total push and pressure of the cosmos," which, when
reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1921) (citations omitted).
120. DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 239.
121. Id. at 240.
122. Id. at 245.
123. See id.
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surrounding his immediate problem to know instinctively which
interpretation of a small set of cases would survive if the range it must
fit were expanded. But sometimes the expansion will be deliberate
and controversial.
124
This is, however, an aspirational suggestion, rather than a mandate to
judges to attempt, in such a manner, to pursue the best answer to the legal
question presented. Dworkin indicates that the actual judge can expand the
scope of considerations as far as seems promising (which might be quite far
indeed, without any further definition), and even presumes that this already
happens to some extent, so that the addition can be no great new burden on
the judge. Upon close examination, there is no real specific or practical
guidance here for judges, but only the endorsement of a discretionary or
aspirational standard of participation in the arguments before the court.
B. Thoroughness Without Perfection
Like Dworkin, Steven Burton is concerned with upholding the law by
taking care to identify, interpret, and apply all of the legal considerations
involved, but he appears less concerned with the idea of perfecting the law.1 25
Burton, like Dworkin, openly acknowledges that theory is different from
practice, and in reality a judge cannot possibly decide each case before him in
accordance with the law in its entirety.' 26 Indeed, Burton does not appear
wholly convinced that this would be wholly desirable in reality. 127 Unlike
Dworkin, Burton would limit the inputs that a judge may consider by dividing
legal reasons from ad hominem reasons, and any reasons otherwise excluded
by judicial duty or the law's standards.1 28 He refers to discretion as a tool to
be used in situations in which multiple outcomes are lawful. 29 To this extent,
Burton's model may be slightly less realistic than Dworkin's. In Burton's
model, the judge weighs the reasons appropriately before him (i.e., the legal
reasons), by assigning relative importance to each possible reason. 30 Here
Burton may reveal his approach to the precise problem presented in this
124. Id. at 245-46.
125. See STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH, 7, 56 (1992). Burton, however, is
more concerned in his writings with the problem of "gap" cases, and what he calls "stubborn
indeterminacy," than with the problem of a multiplicity of solutions. See id. at 5-34.
126. STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 136 (2d ed.
1995).
127. See id.
128. BURTON, supra note 125, at 37.
129. Id. at43.
130. Id. at 54-62.
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Article. His description of the weighing process refers to a stage in which the
judge himself identifies "all" legal considerations.1 31 Burton thus apparently
contemplates a paradigm in which the judge is ultimately responsible for
ensuring that all potential theories or reasons have been identified.
32
Burton's views on this question appear, however, to be somewhat flexible.
His acknowledgment that judges may reach the same legal conclusion in a
given case, even if they give different explanations for the conclusion, seems
to indicate a belief that it is not necessary to find the single best rationale on
which to decide a case.1 33  In his discussion of the impracticability of
considering everything, Burton states that "[t]o make law and legal reasoning
manageable, you must select from the whole law those parts that are most
germane to a particular case." 134 This clearly indicates a process in which
fewer than all possible considerations are before the judge, but is not
necessarily in tension with the idea of a judge considering more than has been
presented by the parties. Burton notes that as a practical matter, judges are
limited to the cases before them, and are further limited by procedural rules as
to how a case can be brought and how the lawyers must present it.135 This
context, he argues, narrows the focus of any decision that a judge must make,
thus rendering it more manageable.' 36  Such a narrowing of context could
indicate a desire to make possible the search for a "best" answer. Burton
presents the following scenario for the judge, once he or she has received the
plaintiff's complaint, and the briefs on both sides:
131. Id. at 56. Burton describes the process in the following way:
Furthermore, the law is spent by the identification of legal reasons and the exclusion of
other reasons. All legal considerations to be taken into account enter at the identification
step. Reasons are either relevant or irrelevant. Once all relevant reasons have been
identified, no new reason can enter as the ground for the weight of any of them. Irrelevant
reasons are irrelevant. Accordingly, the weight of a legal reason must be a function of the
other relevant reasons together.
Id.
132. In this paradigm, the judge's perspective on the lawyers might be analogized to Holmes's
"bad man" view of the law. That is, the judge might treat the lawyers' interpretations of the law as
somewhat suspect, and thus more actively attempt to discover the correct answer to the question
before them, rather than relying solely on what the lawyers tell them. See Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 701 (1998), reprinted as originally delivered on Jan. 8,
1897 (describing necessity of viewing law as a "bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences").
133. BURTON, supra note 126, at 117.
134. Id. at 136.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Only then would the judge be in a position to decide the question. She
would not, however, have to think about everything before doing
anything. The complaint and the rules and precedents cited in this
[sic] parties' briefs would be before the court. These documents
would call the judge's attention to parts of the legal experience that, in
the lawyers' opinions, are relevant to the case. The judge's reasoning
would focus on the cited rules and precedents, though she could draw
as well on her own research and general knowledge concerning the
law of torts and related criminal or property law, theories of
compensation and responsibility, rules and theories of civil procedure,
and other aspects of the law. Her decision would be manageable
because the lawyers will have presented the case in a manner that
poses a discrete question and proposes a reasoned decision .... The
lawyers thus take the initiative to bring into prominence the most
relevant aspects of the law in its entirety, leaving the rest in the
background as the context for thought. 1
37
Thus it is clear that Burton would allow judges discretion to raise or to
incorporate arguments and information not presented by the parties, but would
not actually require the judge to raise all possible considerations before
making a determination in a case.
C. Precedent Over Perfection
While Dworkin acknowledges the unreality of Judge Hercules, he presents
a clear view that more considerations will lead to a better solution of the
question before the judge. In stark contrast to this, Cass Sunstein presents a
system of legal values that places precedent over perfection of the law.'
38
Sunstein cautions judges against any attempt to "reach reflective equilibrium,"
due to the attendant risk of upsetting precedent.
1 39
Sunstein poses the question of what it means "to say that a difficult case is
'rightly decided,"' and looks for an answer in the realm of analogical
reasoning. 40  While noting certain commonalities between analogical
reasoning and the search for reflective equilibrium, he prefers the less
ambitious mode, describing analogical reasoning as a truncated form of the
search for reflective equilibrium, which cuts off the analysis just where "the
137. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
138. Cass R. Sunstein, On Legal Theory and Legal Practice, in 37 NOMOS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 267-87 (Ian Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew, eds., 1995); see also id. at 276 (describing
Dworkin's contrary view).
139. Id. at 280.
140. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741, 742 (1993).
2004]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
relevant principles go beyond a low level of generality.' 41 Perhaps this is
somewhat like the distinction between what Dworkin's Judge Hercules can
do, and what an actual judge is meant to do to imitate him at a more practical,
limited level. However, none of this analysis resolves the question that must
always be central to analogical reasoning-that is, the question to what the
judge will draw the analogies. Encompassed in that question is whether the
judge will conduct the analogical reasoning based upon the analogies in the
materials presented by the parties, or whether he will look for a better
analogy-a more relevant similarity or difference-for himself. Sunstein
does not provide an answer to this question. Thus we are left with only the
idea that he is opposed to the pursuit of perfection in the law insofar as it
entails extensive or expansive research and reflection on anything beyond
directly relevant precedent.
D. Ambiguity in Reality
Somewhere between Dworkin and Sunstein, with a bit of the same
ambiguity apparent in Burton's writings, are the views of Richard Posner. He
presents an interesting scenario because he might reasonably be expected to
have the most informed view of all scholars on this question, owing to his
position as an active appellate judge. As an academic, however, he has not
written directly to the question presented by this Article. In one of his books,
while not clearly advocating a normative theory, he describes a pattern of
actual practice that appears relevant to the question, and of which he does not
at least appear to disapprove. 42 In that context, he argues that because judges
are required to decide difficult cases the best they can, there must be an
implicit discretion to consider anything relevant to deciding the case,
"whether drawn from positive law or natural law sources."' 143 He states that a
judge's decision would "have to be pretty crazy before it can fairly be called
'lawless."" 44 Perhaps most instructive in this vein is the following statement:
Many disputes, however, have to be resolved at once, even if the rules
are unclear or have to be made up on the spot; and then the judges do
the best they can, using whatever information and insight that the
lawyers give them or that they can dredge up out of their own reading
and experiences. 141
141. Id. at 754.
142. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 232 (1990).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 233.
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It is not clear, though, whether such broad discretion is to be used in any
case, or only in those cases in which the rules are "unclear." It is similarly
unclear what it means for a rule to be "unclear." It may be that Posner is here
referring to so-called "gap" cases. It may be that he refers to scenarios in
which the rules seem clear to the parties and less so to the judge.
Posner underlines the idea of the judge "thinking outside the box" in terms
of the inputs he receives from the parties' arguments and from established
case law, when he minimizes the weight of precedent. He posits instead a
"predictive" model in which the judge attempts to decide a case based on how
he thinks a higher court would decide it.146 Thus, if the higher court would
have gone against precedent, it may also be permissible for the lower court to
do so: "Precedents are essential inputs into the predictive process but they are
not 'the law' itself. .,04' Thus, Posner's academic work, while not clearly
advocating a particular theoretical or practical approach to this precise
question, certainly appears to leave open to judges at least the discretion to
consider additional arguments.
On the other hand, Posner as a judge, rather than as an academic, is hard
to pin down to a particular position. 148 His opinions very often raise points
that might be relevant, but then state that those points not argued by the
parties need not be pursued by the court. 14 9 This accords with his caution
against district court judges using too much of their own knowledge to shape
cases in ways that the parties have not requested. Judge Posner has strongly
cautioned district court judges not to yield to the temptation that comes with
knowledge-not to become too involved a participant in the cases before
them.150  He urged this in a case in which a judge entered an injunction
146. Id. at 225.
147. Id. at 227.
148. Indeed, Posner himself warns academics against the attempt to discern much about any
judge from his opinions, since those opinions are largely written by law clerks.
149. See, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assocs. Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.
2001) (raising point not argued, but dropping it because it was not argued).
150. United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 128 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1997). In this case, the
district court judge modified an injunctive order in a way neither party had explicitly requested. Id.
Thus, no factual record had been developed on the specific point of modification. Id. Appellees,
who had not requested, but wished to keep in place, this new modification, defended the judge's
action based on an argument that the judge had extensive experience in this area. Id. Posner
counseled in response:
But great knowledge is a temptation as well as a resource: a temptation to blur the
separation of powers, to shift the balance between the federal courts and state and local
government too far toward the courts, and to disregard procedural niceties, all in fulfillment
of a confident sense of mission.
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tailored in a way that neither party had requested. Judge Posner
acknowledged the district court judge's superior knowledge in the area, but
cautioned him nonetheless. It may be that Judge Posner would limit this
caution to "issues," because the particular situation he describes might refer to
an "issue" rather than an "argument," but he has not explicitly limited his
remarks to such a context. The language of the warning is, on the contrary,
very general. In another opinion, Judge Posner notes the lack of resources for
identifying any issues the brief should have discussed, by having law clerks
"searching haystacks for needles."' 51 He concluded that "[a] search of the
trial record might turn up additional issues some of which had arguable merit,
but ... we do not conceive that to be our function."'
52
At the same time, however, there is ample evidence that Judge Posner
engages in independent research and reflection beyond that presented to him
by the parties. 153 Even though he often dismisses possible theories he has
considered sua sponte, saying for example that they are inapplicable to the
precise facts of the given case, the fact remains that they entered into his
reflection on the case-indeed they were prominent enough in his thinking to
afford them a presence in the finished opinion.' 54 Furthermore, he wrote the
following passage in an opinion considering whether a lower court should
have allowed an issue to be rebriefed:
Judges are not umpires, calling balls and strikes; or judges of a moot
court, awarding victory to the side that argues better; least of all is that
their disposition in a death case. Appellate courts do rely on counsel
to present the grounds for reversal, but in this country, unlike the
practice in England, where the judges have no law clerks, they do not
depend on counsel to find all the cases and all the reasons in support
of the appeal. The better lawyers resent this, feeling that it is "unfair"
for judges to do the work of the weaker lawyers. But that is the way it
is, and consequently, except in highly unusual cases that we cannot at
present envision, it is only when counsel fails to perfect his client's
appeal or waives potentially meritorious grounds for reversal that his
Id.; see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 216 F.3d 720, 725-26 (8th Cir. 2000), discussed supra note 75.
151. United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating, in
dicta, that both parties have presented incorrect notions of comparable cases, and listing examples of
damage amounts from cases the court found on its own, but remanding on the separate issue of
liability).
154. See, e.g., Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 644 (7th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001); Rager v. Dade Behring,
Inc., 210 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 2000).
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substandard performance will be deemed sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant giving his client a new appeal. We add that the issues that the
Indiana Supreme Court did not allow to be rebriefed, as it were, have
no apparent merit. 155
Judge Posner perhaps cabins his position in one opinion, stating that a
court of appeals does "not reverse judgments in civil cases on the basis of
grounds not argued by the appellant at any stage of the litigation-grounds,
therefore, that the appellee had no opportunity to meet.' 56 This sounds very
much like a fairness argument. It might suggest that it would be acceptable
for the court to take such action (i.e., reversal) if the parties had an
opportunity to submit supplemental briefs or oral arguments on the otherwise
omitted point. Thus, perhaps Judge Posner, in his role as judge, would
advocate a judge's discretion (but not obligation) to inquire into omitted
points, as long as the parties are involved in that inquiry.
None of the theories discernible in these jurisprudential writings provides
a direct answer to the question of the role of the appellate judge, or any very
practical insight into the proper scope of a judge's involvement in the
development of the case before the court. However, they do flesh out certain
background principles that must factor into the formulation of a practical
approach.
IV. A RELATED NOTE ON THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT AND THE USE OF
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
There is a related point that must be added to the discussion before
reaching any conclusions as to the best practical approach to the problem
presented here-that is, the role of precedent and the use of unpublished
opinions. Most scholars and judges assume to a certain extent the role of
precedent as a basic element of common law. For example, Dworkin's chain
novel model, 157 in which the judge continually improves on what is already
there, and Sunstein's analogical reasoning model, 158 are based in some
measure on the idea that while it is not always perfect, precedent is too
valuable to be overlooked in legal decisionmaking. Judges are largely bound
by what has come before-and in turn, their judgments become a part of the
155. Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
156. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1999); see also
Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the damages awarded by the
jury were excessive, but as the defendants do not object to the verdict on this ground, the point is
waived").
157. DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 228-32.
158. SUNSTEIN, supra note 138, at 742-49.
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law for deciding future cases. This is an enormous responsibility, and is in
itself an argument for the importance of having judges decide each case on the
best grounds, with the best reasoning, and within the most appropriate
theoretical framework possible. However, it also raises a question about what
"precedent" includes.
There is a divide in the current system, between published and
unpublished opinions, in terms of the ways in which they may be used and the
weight they may be accorded. 159 The current debate over proposed Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 has excited comment from judges, lawyers,
and nonlawyers alike. 160 Judges must, of course, decide each case according
to the law, but they can, by ordering a case either published or unpublished,
select which of their decisions may (or, perhaps more importantly, may not)
be cited back to them as binding precedent in later cases.'16  Lawyers and
judges both have access in their research to the full array of opinions, but
some of these opinions come with a notation that they are not to be cited,
except, perhaps, in some limited circumstances. 62 If a judge is supposed to
decide the case on the best theory of law, it seems counterproductive for the
judge to leave the whole body of unreported decisions completely
unexamined, as if it did not exist. On the other hand, if a judge may look at
unreported decisions in his own research into the law at issue (or even without
research, simply by recollection of a past unreported decision), it seems
unreasonable to refuse lawyers the opportunity to comment on what the judge
159. The Eighth Circuit has been at the center of a high-profile debate on the publishing divide.
See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated en banc as moot, 235 F.3d
1054 (8th Cir. 2000). However, every circuit has a rule expressing some variation of the theme of
two-tiered authority. See Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial
Power to "Unpublish" Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 135, 137-38 n.13 (2001).
160. Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 would prohibit any limitations on
citation of unpublished cases. It is very narrow in its potential effects, however. It would allow the
cases to be raised, but would not take any position on their precedential or persuasive weight.
161. The basic dividing line is that a case will be published only if it establishes, alters,
modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law, if it criticizes existing law, if it involves a legal issue of
continuing interest, but not if it is duplicative. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. INTERNAL OPER. P. 36.3. Lawyers
may move for publication of decisions, which may or may not be granted. See, e.g., 4TH CIR.
INTERNAL OPER. P. 36.4. This system does not appear to be a highly scientific one, but merely a
question of characterization. That may leave too much to chance, as to what may or may not become
precedential law.
162. Unreported or unpublished opinions often come with a rule something like the following:
These opinions are not to be considered "precedent," but only "persuasive" authority with respect to
a material issue that has not been addressed in a published opinion. See, e.g., 10TH CIR. R. 36.3.
They are only, in such cases, to be cited where there is no published authority on the point at issue.
Some courts (namely the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits) do not even allow for that
exception, but instead make the ban absolute.
[88:251
INVOLVED APPELLATE JUDGING
might find there. 163
There are of course genuine concerns about judicial backlogs and
workloads and the need for a fast-track by way of shorter opinions.
64
However, it is extreme to conclude that an entire (and quite extensive) set of
decisions should not be mentioned in later cases, if they are relevant--even if
they should not actually be considered precedential. If they were decided
properly, they must be relevant. If they are relevant, then a lawyer should be
able to cite them to a judge in the same way he would cite any other opinion
he wished to use for support of his argument or for distinguishing the
argument of his opponent. If there must be a "do not cite" rule, then for the
sake of fairness and predictability, perhaps there ought to be a corresponding
way in which to assure lawyers that the contents of an unpublished opinion
will in no way form a part of the judge's reasoning in his case.
Some judges might argue that the rules governing publication of opinions
already represent an effort to promote the ends endorsed in this Article-that
is, to strive continually for perfection in the law. This argument might
emphasize the balancing act between the thoroughness that goes into
published opinions, leaving anything that does not advance the law by making
a new or different statement to the realm of the unpublished, and thus
promoting efficient use of resources. That is, a judge need not spend a great
deal of time perfecting an unpublished opinion because there is little or no
danger that it will be cited as authority. The judge will instead focus great
attention on the published opinions in order to make sure that anything new is
definitively correct. This is not a satisfactory answer, either in theory or in
practice. As long as there are loopholes allowing for citation of unpublished
cases, then it is always possible that one of these "unperfected" opinions will
at some point be cited to the court. To be satisfied with a less than optimally
written opinion invites further trouble down the road. The problem of getting
around bad precedent is not an insignificant one. This is all to say nothing of
the injustice to the parties that may result from an unpublished opinion that
does not "get it right."
163. One might, of course, make a similar argument regarding precedent from outside the
jurisdiction of the court. If a court is allowed to look beyond those cases cited by the parties, and
may even look for guidance (or even just for ideas) in cases from outside the jurisdiction, it may be
difficult for lawyers to know how far abroad they might reach in endorsing or countering the ideas
the judge might find in these outside cases. Like the unreported decisions from within the
jurisdiction, of course neither the judge nor the lawyers will believe these cases to be authoritative,
but there ought to be a concern about how, in the context of the judge's deliberations, they may color
the interpretation of the arguments explicitly presented by the parties.
164. See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995).
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Thus, though the matter of published and unpublished opinions is not the
subject of this Article, the debate and its ramifications on what constitutes
precedent must form a part of any conclusions that may be drawn about
whether a judge will consider an argument of his own conception, and
perhaps more importantly, how he will do so.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has been critical of the lack of a consistent, reasoned
approach in recent appellate case law and the lack of practical advice from
either philosophers or judges. Such criticism calls for an effort to fill that gap.
The gap must be filled with certain background principles or values in mind.
These include fairness (both to the litigants and to the public); predictability
and uniformity (for the sake of the parties and their attorneys); preservation of
the adversarial process; and the importance of reaching the best answer in the
most practical and efficient manner. With these values in mind, although I
would theoretically endorse a rule of finding the most correct resolution of
any legal question, I believe the reality of judicial resources must preclude an
absolute obligation on the part of appellate judges to ensure that all possible
arguments or legal reasons have been presented. This leaves only a
discretionary standard. I would nonetheless stress that though necessarily
discretionary, such a standard should not be entirely aspirational. I would
advocate an aggressive use of that discretion, strongly urging judges to follow
their instincts about unargued points that they believe may be important to
resolution of a particular case.
Regarding the involvement of the parties, both the fairness considerations
and the asserted importance of an adversarial process for discovering the right
answer, I believe the process need not be unreasonably delayed by
requirements for supplemental briefs or arguments. The reality of appellate
judging is that there are first of all internal checks, both from the judge's law
clerks who will as a matter of course do their own research from an objective
perspective, and from other judges on the panel and from the circuit as a
whole. Furthermore, appellate judges are fully aware of the possibility of
reversal, either by their own circuits en banc or by the Supreme Court, and
certainly seek to avoid that fate. Ultimately there is a procedural check in the
hands of parties as well. A petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc may
be made in any case in which a party believes the court erred in its application
of the law, an opportunity for which no fee is required.
But this is not just about fairness to the parties. One element of the
reasoning behind the encouragement of more active participation by judges is
that courts are entrusted with determining the law for the public, rather than
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just those parties before the court in a particular case. In a common law
system, any decision may affect a future litigant. Thus, the law must be
considered in some measure to be the property of the public. With this in
mind, it should be of the utmost importance to reach the best conclusion (to
"get it right") in each case. Precedent is too highly valued in our legal system
to permit decisions that are based on less than the best reasoning.
This model has serious implications for both judges and lawyers. For
lawyers it may mean that it would be wise to argue on as many points as may
seem at all relevant, even those that might seem less important (or less
controversial) to the lawyer. In those cases, the lawyer's version of a given
argument will be before the court in case a judge wonders about its relevance
and has found a different answer in his own research. 165 For judges it may
mean a slightly greater investment of time, to the extent that there is a
stronger push towards consideration of more than just what appears before the
court. It is likely, however, that much of this activity already occurs. 166 This
is simply a mandate for a more conscious exercise of that consideration.167
Judges should not just look at cases cited by the parties to ensure that they
165. Of course, the lawyer is already required by Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(2)
to disclose any adverse authority (which, incidentally, lends strength to an argument for a systemic
interest in "getting the law right"), but the statement here instead encourages lawyers to come up
with all possible ways of conceptualizing the issues or the arguments in the case, in order to dispose
of every way in which the judge might, on his own, conceptualize the case.
166. Indeed, this may be the hardest paradigm for which to find examples in case law, as the
judge who sees it as a matter within his discretion will rarely justify his action or take the trouble to
explain the reasoning that leads him to go outside the arguments presented by the parties. See, e.g.,
Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (offering no authority for doing so, but considering
sua sponte whether ALI below misread crucial case); Grimes v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 340
F.3d 1007, 1012 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (McKeown, J., dissenting) (pointing out that majority rests on
argument of contract interpretation not pressed by parties); United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S.
441, 457 (1964) (cited on occasion as authority for discretion to consider arguments not made by
parties, but providing no authority or reasoning for that proposition, stating merely that it can "see
nothing to preclude us from reaching the question").
167. Occasionally, courts already pursuing their own reasoning go to another extreme, as in the
example of United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002), which provides a seemingly
unending string of authority and justifications for exercising its discretion to go beyond the parties'
arguments. See id. at 1123-24 (justifying its use of discretion on grounds that Singleton's list of two
conditions is not an exhaustive list, that procedural posture here is unique, that court had asked all
parties to brief RFRA issue for this rehearing en banc and RFRA issue had been before all three trial
courts and before one panel, that judicial resources would be conserved by addressing argument, sua
sponte, that proper administration of criminal law cannot be left to stipulation of parties, that Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) allows court to address, sua sponte, any question affecting criminal
defendant's substantial rights, that court should avoid constitutional grounds if others are available,
etc.). However, this indicates a certain defensiveness in over-justifying the court's authority to go
beyond the bounds of the parties' arguments. I would urge that courts should be mindful and open
about going beyond the parties' arguments, but any such defensiveness undermines the very assertion
of authority.
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accurately reflect what the parties aver, but should pursue any further
questions that the thoughtful examination of those cases might raise. This
should only happen when the judge believes there is an omitted issue or an
argument that might be dispositive or highly influential in the decision. There
is no need to conduct exhaustive independent research on points that raise no
particular concerns for the judge. Furthermore, the additional investment of
time for allowing brief supplemental submissions by the parties once a new
argument has arisen would require only minimal additional judicial resources.
At any rate, there will always be an issue of judicial resources. This raises
an underlying practical question about the difference between a judge who has
been on the bench for twenty years, and a judge who has been on the bench
for two weeks-the difference between their judicial experiences and instincts
may make a dramatic difference in the treatment of the case regardless of their
treatment of issues not raised by the parties. With a wholly discretionary or
aspirational standard, the newer judge may be unsure of the extent to which he
is required to reach beyond the arguments presented by the parties. However,
it may not be feasible to require the newer judge to conduct extra research to
inform himself about all possible theories or arguments or parallels in other
areas of law in order to reach a result as "correct" as the more experienced
judge might reach. Thus, the model I have proposed might require much
more of the newer judge's resources than it would of the more experienced
judge. Some discrepancy must already exist, even without a heightened
standard, but it is unclear whether the effect of the heightened standard would
be felt any more by one or the other of these two judges, and whether that
difference would be of sufficient importance to abandon such a heightened
standard.
Leaving aside the distinction between the experience levels of judges, one
might argue that placing the burden on judges to be certain (presumably by
conducting their own research) to find the best reasoning, the best analogy, or
the best framework on which to decide the case creates a risk that lawyers will
almost entirely give up the responsibility for presenting all of the possible
arguments and instead leave it to the judge to do the work. However, if the
lawyer has any interest in winning the case, that is clearly not the advisable
course to take. On the contrary, the idea that a judge may look beyond the
arguments presented should encourage lawyers to present a more extensive
case than they otherwise would, in order to make certain that the judge
considers their clients' position on a given argument.
With judges looking for the best answer, from whatever source, lawyers
should do their best to prepare their cases even more thoroughly. That should,
in turn, result in better briefs and arguments, which might in turn reduce the
amount of additional judicial resources that must be committed to the search
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for the best answer. In the end, the result should also be better statements and
explanations of the law from the courts, which will benefit the public in terms
of the integrity of the law and in terms of predictability for future conduct and
future lawsuits, and will benefit both the judges and lawyers in that perhaps
consideration of more possible arguments in a given case will clarify the
applicability of certain theories of law.
If a judge were to be constrained by the kind of absolute procedural
boundaries suggested, for example, by Milani and Smith, so that the judge's
choices are between ignoring the better argument or involving the parties in
rebriefing and rearguing, there are several potential problems. First is the
danger that the judge will be wary of the extra time that would be required
and might attempt to construe the original briefs and arguments as having
raised the judge's new argument or reasoning. The danger there is that in the
process, the judge may have to twist the arguments actually made so that the
resulting case law may be less clear than it might have been if the judge had
been able to be straightforward about the alternate reasoning. Another risk is
that the judge might leave out the better argument entirely, and there again the
case law may be less clear or less correct than it might otherwise have been.
Finally, there is a possibility that the judge may indeed involve the parties in
the new reasoning but will as a result take longer to resolve cases and thus be
able to deal with fewer cases. If the judge can cut out the extra time by setting
things on the right path, albeit in a careful manner, showing his work, so to
speak, the parties will always have the chance to petition for rehearing if the
judge got the reasoning wrong.
In all likelihood, though it is difficult to gather any kind of quantifiable
evidence, judges often do employ their own reasoning where the briefs have
not made the best arguments, but do not note that they are doing so. I would
urge judges to use those qualities for which they were chosen to act as judges
not only to reason as well and as clearly as possible, but to account for their
reasoning by laying their cards on the table as they do so.
VI. A FINAL NOTE
It is perhaps worth noting here that a large number of the points in this
Article have been drawn from or have relied upon remarks and discussions
found in footnotes and dissents. This indicates not only that the issue
addressed here is a matter of some contention, but also that it has not yet
attracted the kind of attention that it merits. Thus, perhaps the first practical
step the courts must take on this issue is to bring the discussion into the fore-
that is, to the text of the majority opinions to which it is relevant. Then, at
least we might gain a clearer vision of how appellate judges conceive of their
2004]
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role as potential participants in the conceptualization of the matters before
them.
